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FOUR TH CIRCUIT RE VIE W
spouse may claim the exemption or the couple may divide the exemption
between them in any proportion.75 Alternatively, since many of the provi-
sions of the Virginia exemption statute require the claimant be a. house-
holder,7 the state legislature should amend the householder definition to
include any wage-earner who supports himself or others.7 7 Either
modification of the Virginia homestead exemption statute complies with
the Congressional mandate in the Federal Bankruptcy Reform Act, by
granting an exemption to each debtor in a joint case,78 and promotes the
policies behind homestead exemptions.79
DIANE PATRICIA CAREY
IV. CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. Assessing Court Costs Against Indigent Litigants
Economic assets should have no effect on a person's right of access
to the United States court system.1 Congress has required, however,
that persons bringing suit in federal court pay filing fees.2 Realizing that
this requirement effectively could close the courts to indigents, Con-
gress enacted section 1915 of Title 28 of the United States Code.' Section
1915 provides that a court may waive the necessity of prepaying court
costs and fees if a person is an indigent who otherwise cannot afford to
obtain access to the federal courts.4 While enacting section 1915,
," See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1101(c) (Cum. Supp. 1981) (married couple may
claim only one homestead exemption not exceeding $20,000 in value); TENN. CODE ANN. §
26-2-301 (1980) (exemption for jointly owned property shall not exceed $7500).
78 See VA. CODE § 34-4 (Cum. Supp. 1981) (only householder may claim homestead ex-
emption); Id. § 34-26 (only householder may exempt enumerated articles of personal prop-
erty).
" Ulrich, supra note 2, at 153.
7 11 U.S.C. § 522(m) (1979); see text accompanying note 30 supra.
7" See text accompanying notes 2 & 40 supra.
' See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971) (welfare recipients seeking
divorce need not pay filing fee); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (state required to
provide transcript of criminal trial to indigent appellants).
28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (1976 & Supp. II 1979).
Section 1915(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides:
Any court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or
defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein,
without prepayment of fees and costs or security therefor, by a person who makes
affidavit that he is unable to pay such costs or give security therefor. Such af-
fidavit shall state the nature of the action, defense or appeal and affiant's belief
that he is entitled to redress.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1976).
IdM; see text accompanying notes 43-50 infra.
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however, Congress failed to create guidelines by which courts were to
implement the statute.' Consequently, courts have had to exercise their
discretion in devising standards of indigency and in defining "court costs."6
Generally, a court will allow a successful litigant to collect court costs
from the opposing party.' If the unsuccessful opposing party is an indi-
gent, however, the indigent's realization that a court may assess court
costs against him could deter the indigent from bringing suit.' In Flint v.
Haynes,9 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently considered
whether courts should assess costs and fees under section 1915 against
unsuccessful indigent plaintiffs."
Flint was a consolidated appeal from three separate inmate civil
rights actions.1 Charles F. Flint, Jr., instituted an action against the
wardens of Huttonsville Correctional Center and the West Virginia
State Penitentiary pursuant to section 1983 of Title 42 of the United
States Code.12 Flint alleged that the wardens were responsible for put-
ting him in solitary confinement in violation of his due process rights. 3
Note, Petitions to Sue In Forma Pauperis in Federal Courts: Standards and Pro-
cedures for the Exercise of Judicial Discretion, 56 B.U. L. REV. 745, 745-46 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Petitions to Sue]; see, e.g., Lee v. Habib, 424 F.2d 891, 904 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (United States must pay for transcripts for indigent appellants if substantial question
is raised); Haymes v. Smith, 73 F.R.D. 572, 575 (W.D.N.Y. 1976) (defendant must pay for
inmate-plaintiff's deposition expenses). But see, e.g., McClure v. Salvation Army, 51 F.R.D.
215, 216 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (Government does not have to furnish copy of transcript at its own
expense to indigent litigant); Ebenhart v. Power, 309 F. Supp. 660, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
(Government not required to pay indigent's discovery costs). See generally Catz & Guyer,
Federal In Forma Pauperis Litigation" In Search of Judicial Standards, 31 RUTGERS L. REV.
655, 656 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Catz & Guyer] (lack of congressional guidance resp.onsi-
ble for diffuse and inconsistent body of case law); Note, Litigation Costs: The Hidden Bar-
rier to the Indigent, 56 GEO. L.J. 516, 524-27 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Litigation Costs]
(courts have interpreted standards for in forma pauperis status differently).
' Catz & Guyer, supra note 5, at 663-64; Note, Indigency: What Test?, 33 ARK. L. REV.
544, 551-52 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Indigency].
FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d).
See text accompanying notes 43-50 infra.
9 651 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1981).
, Id. at 971-72.
Id. at 971.
12 Id. at 972. Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
11 651 F.2d at 972. In Cooper v. Pate, the Supreme Court of the United States recog-
nized the right of state prisoners to seek relief under § 1983 because of conditions relating
to confinement. 378 U.S. 546, 546 (1964) (per curiam) (discrimination based on inmate's
religious beliefs). State prisoners retain certain fundamental rights despite their incarcera-
tion. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (per curiam) (freedom of religion); Gray v.
[Vol. XXXIX
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Rodney Allen Stover brought an assault action against two correctional
officers from the Huttonsville Correctional Center under section 1983.4
Richard Earl Marks filed a section 1983 action against two correctional
officers of the West Virginia Penitentiary. 5 Marks alleged that the two
officers denied him free clothing and toilet articles." The United States
District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia granted all
three plaintiffs in forma pauperis status under section 1915.17
The district court heard each case separately." The court first decid-
ed Marks v. Calendine9 and subsequently based its decision in Flint and
Stover on the earlier Marks decision." In Marks, the jury resolved the
substantive issues of Marks' section 1983 suit in favor of the defendant
correctional officers.2 In response to the defendants' request, the clerk
of the court taxed costs against Marks pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' In deciding whether the taxation of
Creamer, 465 F.2d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 1972) (fourteenth amendment rights to equal protection
under the laws); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 647 (E.D. Va. 1971), supp. op., 354 F.
Supp. 1302 (E.D. Va. 1973) (eighth amendment right to freedom from cruel and unusual
punishment); Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (freedom of ex-
pression); Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits in the
Federal Courts, 92 HARv. L. REV. 610, 610-11 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Turner]. See
generally Bergesen, California Prisoners: Rights Without Remedies, 25 STAN. L. REV. 1,
41-48 (1972).
:, 651 F.2d at 972.
15 Id. at 971.
d I. Marks' supplemental complaint alleged that the defendants also confiscated
clothing purchased with plaintiff's personal funds. Id.
11 Id. at 971-72. When Flint filed his claim for in forma pauperis status, he had no
assets. Id. at 972 n.3. Stover had $7.29 when he filed suit. Id. at 972 nA. When Marks filed
suit, he had a disposable income of $20.00 a month. Id. at 971 n.2. All three plaintiffs suc-
cessfully applied for in forma pauperis status. Id. at 971-72.
In forma pauperis designates a proceeding "in the manner of a pauper" in which the
court allows the litigant to pursue his claim or defense without a prepayment of fees. Note,
Indigent Access to Civil Courts: The Tiger Is at the Gates, 26 VAND. L. REV. 25, 26 n.2
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Indigent Access]. The statutory benefit of § 1915 enabling a party
to proceed in forma pauperis is a privilege, not a right. Williams v. Field, 394 F.2d 329, 332
(9th Cir.) (prisoner civil rights claim), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 891 (1968); Carter v. Telectron,
Inc., 452 F. Supp. 939, 943 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (pauper status denied when plaintiff had out-
standing judgment of over $5,000 against United States). But see Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 337 (1948) (Court referred to in forma pauperis status in dicta
as right, not privilege); Smith v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 255 F. Supp. 905, 907 (E.D.
Pa. 1966), affd per curiam, 374 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1967) (court stated in forma pauperis is
statutory right).
" 651 F.2d at 971-72.
1' 80 F.R.D. 24 (N.D. W. Va. 1978).
= 651 F.2d at 972.
21 Id at 971.
= Id. Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for an allowance of
costs to the prevailing party. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d). Such an allowance, however, will yield to
a countervailing United States statute or federal rule of civil procedure or a contrary court
ruling. Id.
19821
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costs was proper, the district court emphasized the lack of merit in
Marks' claim.' The court noted that the scarcity of decisions considering
the propriety of assessing costs against indigents indicated a general
court practice of treating the grant of in forma pauperis status as a com-
plete waiver of the costs of litigation.24 The district court recognized,
however, that courts commonly do assess costs when a claim completely
lacks merit and the litigant has used the court as a vehicle of harass-
ment.' Consequently, the district court in Marks allowed the taxation of
costs against Marks because of the lack of merit in his claim.2' The
district court then entered judgment and assessed costs against both
Stover and Flint on the basis of the Marks decisionY
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the indigent appellants argued that
section 1915 allows an assessment of costs only in exceptional cir-
cumstances.' The appellants contended that courts should tax costs
against an indigent in a section 1915(d) situation only when the court has
dismissed the claim as frivolous and without merit.' The appellants
claimed that an assessment of costs against indigent litigants would
limit access to the courts for indigents." The appellants contended that
the standard for taxing filing fees and costs should resemble the stand-
ards for awarding attorney's fees under federal statutes."1 The State
argued that section 1915 explicitly authorizes an assessment of costs
against unsuccessful indigent litigants.
80 F.R.D. 24, 25 (N.D. W. Va. 1978).
21 Id. at 31.
2 Id. The court may dismiss the action and adjudge costs against the indigent if the
court concludes that the'action is frivolous or malicious. Duhart v. Carlson, 469 F.2d 471, 478
(10th Cir. 1972) (prisoner's meritless complaint alleged discrimination based on race and
religion), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 958 (1973); Caviness v. Somers, 235 F.2d 455, 456 (4th Cir.
1956) (per curiam) (prisoner alleged mistreatment by United States marshal). Federal
district courts exercise broad discretion to deny state prisoners the privilege of proceeding
in forma pauperis in civil actions against prison officials to prevent the filing of frivolous
suits to harass the officials. See, e.g., Daye v. Bounds, 509 F.2d 66, 68 (4th Cir.) (prisoner §
1983 action against prison officials), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1002 (1975); Shobe v. California,
362 F.2d 545, 546 (9th Cir.) (prisoner alleged prison officials withheld plaintiff's money and
property), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 887 (1966); Hawkins v. Elliott, 385 F. Supp. 354, 357 (D.S.C.
1974) (prisoners brought suit against prison officials alleging cruel and unusual punishment).
80 F.R.D. 24, 31 (N.D. W. Va. 1978).
651 F.2d at 972.
Id. at 973. Marks and Stover only appealed the assessment of court costs. Id. at 971
n.1. In addition to his appeal of the assessment of costs, Flint was unsuccessful in appealing
the jury's decision on the substantive issues of his claim. Id.
Id. at 973. Although the district court eventually found Marks' claim meritless, the
Marks court did not dismiss the suit. 80 F.R.D. 24, 32 (N.D. W. Va. 1978).
651 F.2d at 973.
1 Id In Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, the Supreme Court held that a district
court may award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978). The district court may -award attorney's fees
upon a finding that the action was frivolous, unreasonable, or unfounded even in the absence
of subjective bad faith. Id. at 421.
32 See 651 F.2d at 972; text accompanying notes 34-36 infra.
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The Fourth Circuit rejected the appellants' interpretation of section
1915.1 In affirming the rulings of the district court, the Fourth Circuit
held that section 1915 requires indigents to pay court costs at the court's
discretion.' The Fourth Circuit did not accept the appellants' argument
that federal courts should tax costs according to the standards for
awarding attorney's fees that the United States Supreme Court favored
in Hughes v. Rowe." The Fourth Circuit stated that awarding costs only
in situations in which the claim was meritless would, ignore the specific
language of section 1915(a) and 1915(e).11 The Fourth Circuit reasoned
that by using the word "prepayment" in subsection (a),. Congress did not
intend to waive the payment of litigation costs permanently. 7 Further-
more, the Fourth Circuit noted that by permitting an assessment of
costs "as in other cases," subsection (e) evinced a congressional intent to
impose eventual liability for costs on indigents.1
The Fourth Circuit correctly recognized the danger of granting com-
plete immunity from costs to indigent litigants." If federal courts do not
651 F.2d at 972.
Id. Reversal of a judge's decision to refuse permission for an indigent to proceed in
forma pauperis requires a clear abuse of discretion. Litigation Costs, supra note 5, at 525
n.62; see, e.g., Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir.) (grant of in forma pauperis status
left to sound discretion of court), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 896 (1965); Seltzer v. Warden,
Bushnell & Glesner Co., 109 Ill. App. 137, 138 (1902) (trial court committed prejudicial error
in refusing application for pauper status).
' 651 F.2d at 973. The Supreme Court extended the Christiansburg standard of
awarding attorney's fees to civil rights actions under § 1983 in Hughes v. Rowe. 449 U.S. 5,
14-15 (1980) (per curiam); see note 31 supra.
1 651 F.2d at 972-73. Section 1915(e) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides:
Judgment may be rendered for costs at the conclusion of the suit or action as in
other cases, but the United States shall not be liable for any of the costs thus in-
curred. If the United States has paid the cost of a stenographic transcript or
printed record for the prevailing party, the same shall be taxed in favor of the
United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (1976); see note 3 supra.
s' 651 F.2d at 972; see note 3 supra.
651 F.2d at 972.
Id. at 974. A court assessment of costs against indigents to preclude groundless
suits, however, may violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution. Litigation Costs, supra note 5, at 534-43; see U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV. When a class does not include all persons that a problem affects, the classifica-
tion is underinclusive and violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (statute requiring steriliza-
tion of habitual criminals violates equal protection clause). See generally Tussman and ten-
Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 351 (1949). Assessing costs
against indigents to prevent frivolous suits is underinclusive because frivolous suits are not
peculiar to the poor, yet the poor are the only ones that a court assessment of costs effec-
tively deters. Litigation Costs, supra note 5, at 534-43.
Another commentator has noted that the right to access to the courts is a fundamental
first amendment right. Note, A First Amendment Right of Access to the Courts for In-
digents, 82 YALE L.J. 1055, 1059-63 (1973); see U.S. CONST. amend. I. The author argues that
the right to judicial access for indigents rests on the first amendment right to petition. 82
1982]
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require indigents to make a cost-benefit analysis, the danger exists that
litigants will abuse the section 1915 privilege by bringing meritless
claims either for harassment purposes or on a misguided pro se basis."
In either event, indigent litigants might unnecessarily burden an
already overcrowded court calendar. 1 The Fourth Circuit explicitly has
recognized the need to prevent frivolous suits and has adjudged costs
against a party to prevent the pursuit of a meritless action.42
The Fourth Circuit erred in Flint by applying a literal interpretation
to section 1915.13 The Fourth Circuit's holding is unsound because it is in-
consistent with the purpose of section 1915."4 Congress enacted section
1915 and its predecessors to provide persons who could not afford to pay
the costs of litigation with access to the courts of the United States. 5 By
requiring the unsuccessful indigent litigants in Flint to pay the assess-
ment of full court costs and fees, the Fourth Circuit imposed a pro-
hibitively high price on the indigents' right to court access."6 A court
assessment of costs against an indigent litigant has little practical effect
YALE L.J., supra at 1059-63. The Supreme Court cursorily dismissed a first amendment
claim to court access on the appellate level. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660 n.5 (1973)
(per curiam) (Court required filing fee for indigent's appeal of administrative hearing on
welfare matter). The Ortwein Court's examination, however, might support an inference
that the first amendment secures a right of access to an initial hearing without
governmentally-imposed costs. See id. at 660.
41 See, e.g., Daye v. Bounds, 509 F.2d 66, 68 (4th Cir.) (prisoner § 1983 action against
prison officials), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1002 (1975); Shobe v. California, 362 F.2d 545, 546 (9th
Cir.) (court has especially broad discretion to dismiss prisoner civil actions against wardens),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 887 (1966); Turner, supra note 13, at 646-47.
" Turner, supra note 13, at 647.
42 Perkins v. Cingliano, 296 F.2d 567, 568 (4th Cir. 1961) (court may assess costs against
indigents holding in forma pauperis status).
"s 651 F.2d at 973. The Fourth Circuit was correct, however, in not extending the stan-
dard used to assess costs to include attorney's fees. Id. The "English Rule" regularly allows
an assessment of counsel fees to the prevailing party. Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness
Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247 n.18 (1975). The "American Rule," however, forbids a prevailing
party to recover attorney's fees from the opposing party subject to certain exceptions. Id
at 269. A court may award attorney's fees against a party who acted in bad faith or under
the "common benefit" exception. Id. at 270 n.46. Contrastingly, a court may assess court
costs as a matter of course. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d).
" See text accompanying notes 45-50 infra.
'5 H.R. REP. No. 1079, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1892). In 1892, Congress enacted the first
federal in forma pauperis statute, which opened United States courts to citizens who were
unable to bear the costs of civil litigation. Act of July 20, 1892, ch. 209, § 1, 27 Stat. 252.
Courts gave a restricted construction to the Act of 1892, which compelled Congress to
amend the Act substantially in 1910, 1922, 1949, 1951, and 1959- Catz & Guyer, supra note 5,
at 657-58. The 1910 amendment applied the statute to both civil and criminal actions and to
indigent defendants as well as plaintiffs. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 435, § 1, 36 Stat. 866; see
Duniway, The Poor Man in the Federal Courts, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1270, 1272-73 (1966). In
1951, Congress expressly disclaimed any liability for costs that an opponent of an unsuc-
cessful pauper incurred. Act of 1951, ch. 655, § 51(e), 65 Stat. 727. In 1959, Congress expanded
the benefitting class from "citizens" to any "person." Act of September 21, 1959, Pub. L. No.
86-320, § 1, 73 Stat. 590.
" See text accompanying notes 47-50 infra.
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as long as the indigent remains penniless." Therefore; if an indigent has
no income and expects no income, a retrospective assessment of costs
will have little detrimental effect on the indigent's decision to file a
claim." The threat to equal access to the courts exists when the indigent
litigant has some assets or reasonably expects future income. 9 If an indi-
gent has minimal assets, a court assessment of costs will have a greater
effect on indigents than on non-indigents. The disproportionate impact
on the indigent's assets may deter the indigent from filing suit. 0 Thus,
the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of section 1915 in Flint threatens
equal access.
The Fourth Circuit applied the plain meaning rule of statutory inter-
pretation in Flint." The Fourth Circuit's use of the plain meaning rule in
interpreting section 1915 was erroneous.2 The two most widely
recognized theories of statutory interpretation are literalism, of which
the plain meaning rule is a part, and the "purpose" theory. 3 Literalism
precludes court construction of a statute that is plain and unambiguous
on its face." The "purpose" theory encourages court consideration of a
statute's legislative history to determine the statute's purpose.
55
Employing the purpose theory, a court will interpret a statute to fulfill
the statute's purpose28 The Supreme Court upheld the use of the "pur-
4' Catz & Guyer, supra note 5, at 668. If the indigent litigant remains penniless, a court
essentially waives payment of court costs by granting a litigant in forma pauperis status.
Jones v. Bales, 58 F.R.D. 453, 463 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (indigent proceeding in forma pauperis im-
mune from court imposition of costs), affd per curiam, 480 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1973).
" Catz & Guyer, supra note 5, at 668.
"See Willging, Financial Barriers and the Access of Indigents to the Courts, 57 GEO.
L.J. 253, 257 (1968). A court assessment of costs under § 1915 perpetuates an indigent's
poverty. Id. Defendants periodically have seized Marks' income of $20.00 a month to execute
their judgment. 651 F.2d at 972 n.2.
" See Houseman, Equal Protection and the Poor, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 887, 894 (1977).
Commentators have suggested that Congress broaden the scope of § 1915 to cover all litiga-
tion expenses. Id.; see Willging, Financial Barriers and the Access of Indigents to the
Courts, 57 GEo. L.J. 253, 257 (1968) (court assessment of costs under § 1915 perpetuates
litigants' poverty). An extension of § 1915, however, might encourage indigents to institute
frivolous claims because of the lack of a cost-benefit analysis. See text accompanying notes
40-42 supra.
s See text accompanying notes 53-55 infra. When the words of a statute are clear and
unambiguous on their face, the plain meaning of the statute is the final expression of Con-
gress' intent. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917). The plain meaning rule
forbids a court to add or subtract to the plain meaning of the words. Id.
See text accompanying notes 53-60 infra.
Coffman, Essay on Statutory Interpretation, 9 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 57, 65-67 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Coffman].
Id. at 66; see Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REV. 863, 866 (1930)
[hereinafter cited as Radin] (words of statute may not be disregarded).
" Coffman, supra note 53, at 71.
Merz, The Meaninglessness of the Plain Meaning Rule, 4 U. DAYTON L. REV. 31,
39-40 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Merz]. See generally Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the
Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 533 (1947) (judges must capture what is below
surface of words).
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pose" theory in United States v. American Trucking Associations.7 In
American Trucking, the Court stated that no rule of law could forbid
court consideration or court interpretation of a statute according to the
statute's purpose. 8 If a legislature does not express itself clearly, a
court's literal interpretation of a statute may result in a failure to deal
with the policy problem the legislature intended the enactment to ad-
dress. 9 Under these circumstances, the court has a duty to reconcile the
statute with its purpose.
In Flint, the Fourth Circuit should have considered the legislative
history and purpose of section 1915 to determine the statute's meaning.
6'
Congress enacted section 1915 to provide people who cannot afford to
pay the costs of litigation with equal access to United States courts. 62 A
court assessment of full costs may deter an indigent's decision to protect
310 U.S. 534 (1940).
Id. at 543-44. In United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, the Supreme Court
considered a statutory regulation of "employees" of motor carriers. Id. at 535. The Supreme
Court stated that to interpret a statute properly a court must construe the language of the
statute to give effect to the congressional intent. Id. at 542. The Supreme Court reaffirmed
the American Trucking language in Cass v. United States. 417 U.S. 72, 76-79 (1974). In Cass,
the Court refused to ignore the clearly relevant history of a statute that provided for a
readjustment of the pay of an armed forces reservist. Id. at 79. The Cass Court rejected the
argument that a statute could be so plain as to render inquiry into legislative history im-
proper. Id. at 76-78. Contra, Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 492 (1947) (unam-
biguous statute requires no clarification by resorting to legislative history).
While interpreting a statute, a court may not completely ignore the words of the
statute. United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. at 543; Radin, supra note 57,
at 866. Complete disregard for the statutory language would eliminate protection against a
court's superimposing its individual wishes on the statute. See generally id. at 879-81.
Despite the lack of support for the plain meaning rule from the Supreme Court, some
lower federal courts still use plain meaning rule language. E.g., Globe Seaways, Inc. v.
Panama Canal Co., 509 F.2d 969, 971 (5th Cir. 1975) (court must not refer to legislative
history if statutory language is clear); Heilman v. Levi, 391 F. Supp. 1106, 1112 (E.D. Wis.)
(if language is plain, court must enforce language), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 959 (1975); see Ker-
nochan, Statutory Interpretation: An Outline of Method, 3 DALHOUSIE L.J. 333, 340 (1976).
Even though some lower federal courts use plain meaning rule language, a majority of these
courts generally will not refuse to look at the legislative history of a statute. Murphy, Old
Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-Meaning Rule" and Statutory Interpretation in the
"Modem" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299, 1304-05 (1975). The Supreme Court also
has used plain meaning rule language and then considered the legislative history of a par-
ticular statute. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201-11 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 736 n.8 (1975). The Ernst decision is a typical case that
considers both the plain meaning of a statute and the statute's legislative history. 425 U.S.
at 201-11. After using the plain meaning rule to support its interpretation of § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-77111 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), the Court con-
sidered the legislative history of the 1934 Act before concluding that a private cause of action
for damages would not lie under § 10(b) in the absence of any allegation of scienter. Id.
" See Merz, supra note 59, at 33.
o Coffman, supra note 56, at 66-67.
" See note 47 supra.
62 Id.
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his rights." Courts should interpret section 1915 as providing equal,
uninhibited access to the courts, not as requiring an assessment of full
costs against indigent litigants.
Because federal courts have had to create their own standards for
assessing court costs, courts have applied section 1915 inconsistently. 4
A lack of statutory direction in the formulation of a standard of indigen-
cy compounds the confusion surrounding section 1915.5 The Supreme
Court has furnished the only guidance for defining indigency in Adkins
v. E.I DuPont de Nemours & Co.66 The Supreme Court stated in Adkins
that a petitioner for in forma pauperis status need not be destitute to in-
voke section 1915.67 Beyond the Adkins decision, no uniform standards
See text accompanying notes 46-50 supra.
See note 5 supra. The Supreme Court has added to the uncertainty of whether to re-
quire indigents to pay costs. In Boddie v. Connecticut, the Court ruled that welfare reci-
pients who were seeking a divorce did not have to pay the average $60.00 fee that was a
prerequisite to a divorce action. 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971). In two subsequent decisions, the
Supreme Court limited the broad Boddie decision in favor of a waiver of costs for indigents.
Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 657 (1973) (per curiam) (filing fee for appeal of ad-
'ninistrative hearing on welfare matter); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 444-45 (1973)
(fee to file bankruptcy proceedings). The Court in Kras stated that the two elements upon
which the Court based the Boddie decision, a fundamental relationship and state
monopolization, were not present in Kras' bankruptcy proceeding. 409 U.S. at 444-45. The
Supreme Court did not support a waiver of the prerequisite bankruptcy court fee because
Kras' interests did not rise to the same constitutional level as that in Boddie. 409 U.S. at
445. The Court in Kras stated further that the exclusive government control in Boddie was
not present. Id. at 445; see Comment, The Heirs of Boddie: Court Access for Indigents After
Kras and Ortwein, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 571, 590 (1973).
The statute's failure to define court costs and fees has led to inconsistent court inter-
pretations of § 1915. Catz & Guyer, supra note 5, at 659-60; Indigent Access, supra note 17,
at 26-29. Litigation expenses fall into four categories. Catz & Guyer, supra note 5, at 659.
First, costs, or "taxable costs," are the normal and incidental expenditures of the parties in
preparing for litigation with the exception of attorney's fees. Id.; Columb v. Webster Mfg.
Co., 76 F. 198, 200 (D. Mass. 1896), affd, 84 F. 592 (1st Cir. 1898). Second , fees, or "costs," are
the expenditurei a litigant must pay to various officers of the court at successive stages.
Catz & Guyer, supra note 5, at 659-60. This category includes filing fees, marshal and pro-
cess fees, jury fees, and subpoena fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1976). A court may tax the non-
prevailing party with such fees. Id. Third, security bonds are deposits that a court requires
to insure payments and damages by the losing party. Catz & Guyer, supra note 5, at 660.
Courts frequently require the deposits as a prerequisite to the exercise of equitable powers
such as replevin and injunction. Id.; see FED. R. CIv. P. 65(c). Last, expenses are any expen-
ditures that do not fall within the other three categories. Catz & Guyer, supra note 5, at
660. Examples of expenses are attorney's fees and expenditures for the preparation of
evidence, reimbursement of witnesses, and discovery. Id. The different categories of court
costs has engendered inconsistency in court application of § 1915. Id. at 659-60. Congres-
sional guidelines creating uniform notions of court costs would help eliminate the confusion.
Id.
Id. at 663; Indigency, supra note 6, at 551-52.
335 U.S. 331 (1948).
" Id. at 339; accord, Earls v. Superior Court, 490 P.2d 814, 818, 98 Cal. Rptr. 302, 306
(1971) (applicant for in forma pauperis status need not be destitute); People ex rel. Barnes v.
Chytraus, 228 IlM. 194, 196, 81 N.E. 844, 846 (1907) (applicant for in forma pauperis status
need not be a pauper).
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and procedures exist to guide the federal courts in the evaluation of in
forma pauperis petitions. 8 Exercising judicial discretion in creating
standards for applying section 1915, some courts have adopted a plan
assessing partial payment of court costs. 9 In Flint, the Fourth Circuit
could have balanced the equal access and cost-benefit analysis considera-
tions more accurately by implementing an assessment of partial costs
under section 1915. In Braden v. Estelle,7° the Texas district court
adopted a flexible plan requiring partial payment of court costs by
prisoners seeking in forma pauperis status but who could afford a
minimal payment.71 Although the Braden court created the partial pay-
ment scheme specifically in response to increased prisoner litigation,72
" Catz & Guyer, supra note 5, at 663. Federal courts have adopted different standards
of indigency to review petitions for in forma pauperis status. See, e.g., Ward v. Werner, 61
F.R.D. 639, 640 (M.D. Pa. 1974); Shimabuku v. Britton, 357 F. Supp. 825, 826 (D. Kan. 1973),
affd, 503 F.2d 38 (10th Cir. 1974). In order to attain in forma pauperis status, a poor litigant,
either a plaintiff or a defendant, must file a motion for pauper status with an attached af-
fidavit of poverty. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1976). A litigant may file the in forma pauperis peti-
tion at any stage of the proceedings. Flowers v. Turbine Support Div., 507 F.2d 1242, 1245
(5th Cir. 1975) (civil rights action alleging sex discrimination). The court grants or denies the
petition according to the standard of indigency in effect. Catz & Guyer, supra note 5, at 661.
One commentator has proposed a standard of indigency based on net income and relative li-
quidity of assets over a standard focusing on an applicant's gross income and assets. Catz &
Guyer, supra note 5, at 663-64. Another commentator has supported a standard based on an
applicant's financial status at the time the applicant petitions for pauper status instead of a
test that considers the applicant's fitness to work and makes assumptions regarding employ-
ment availability. Indigency, supra note 6, at 551-52.
In reviewing applications ,for in forma pauperis status, courts also will consider the
merit of the claim. Petitions to Sue, supra note 5, at 746-52. Courts differ in the amount of
merit necessary for an applicant to qualify for in forma pauperis status. Id. Some courts sup-
port a very easy standard. Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 891 (5th Cir. 1976) (claim of in for-
ma pauperis status must be of arguable merit); Durham v. United States, 400 F.2d 879, 880
(10th Cir. 1968) (possible to make rational argument on law or facts in support of claim), cert
denied, 394 U.S. 932 (1969). Under a stricter standard, courts grant in forma pauperis status
only in "exceptional circumstances." Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598, 600 (9th Cir. 1963)
(petition for in forma pauperis status must show exceptional circumstances). The standard
of review between the two extremes requires that the applicant's claim have a reasonable
chance of success. Jones v. Bales, 58 F.R.D. 453, 464 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (more than a slight
chance of success), affd per curiam, 480 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1973); Deshotels v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 116 F. Supp. 55, 59 (W.D. La. 1953) (reasonable chance of success), affd, 219 F.2d
271 (5th Cir. 1955).
11 Zaun v. Dobbin, 628 F.2d 990, 993 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (when not unfair to pay
portion of costs, court can require partial payment and waive rest); Williams v. Spencer, 455
F. Supp. 205, 209 (D. Md. 1978) (at least substantial partial payment of costs); Braden v.
Estelle, 428 F. Supp. 595, 596 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (partial payment of court costs by prisoners
seeking to proceed in forma pauperis who can afford minimal payment); United States ex
rel. Irons v. Pennsylvania, 407 F. Supp. 746, 747 (M.D. Pa. 1976) (at least partial payment of
costs).
70 428 F. Supp. 595 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
71 Id at 598.
Id- at 601.
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the Texas court's analysis is not limited to prisoner suits. ' Courts have
expanded the plan's application to indigent suits in general. 4
The Braden court used the discretion that Congress implicitly pro-
vided in section 1915 to waive part of the costs of litigation. 5 The result
has been to create cost standards that are not prohibitive for indigents.
7 6
The Texas court used previously adopted mandatory affidavits of in-
digency to give an accurate representation of the litigant's assets.
7
After determining the applicant's assets, the court assessed costs ac-
cording to the indigent's ability to pay. 8 Although the indigent is
unaware of the exact amount of costs he will have to pay, the realization
that a court may assess costs will require the indigent to consider the
relative merit of his claim. 9
The Fourth Circuit's decision to assess the entire amount of costs
against litigants proceeding in forma pauperis is suspect. The purpose of
section 1915 is to provide equal access to the courts. The Fourth Cir-
cuit's decision in Flint defeats the purpose of section 1915.1' The unde-
sirable effect of Flint is to allow courts in the Fourth Circuit to assess
costs against in forma pauperis litigants.82 The Fourth Circuit was cor-
rect, however, in noting that a court creates the danger of litigants'
overloading court calendars with frivolous claims by giving complete
financial immunity to indigent litigants.'
To reduce the unnecessary inconsistency and confusion that presently
surrounds the statute, Congress should enact legislation to create uni-
formity in the granting of in forma pauperis status. Short of congres-
sional guidelines or a specific ruling by the Supreme Court, the Fourth
Circuit should institute standards of partial payment of costs. 4 By imple-
menting a partial payment plan, the Fourth Circuit would not threaten
" See note 69 supra.
74 I&
,1 428 F. Supp. 595, 597 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
78 Id.
7 Id. at 600. The Braden court also had direct access by telephone and computer to
records of prison inmates' trust account balances during the prisoners' incarcerations. Id.
78 Id. at 600-01.
Id- at 596.
See text accompanying note 45 supra.
81 See text accompanying notes 44-50 supra.
8 Perkins v. Cingliano, 296 F.2d 567, 568 (4th Cir. 1961) (court may assess costs against
indigents).
" See text accompanying notes 39-42 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 68-78 supra. Courts could require persons applying for
pauper status to complete a detailed statement of poverty that the person must submit with
the affidavit of poverty that § 1915 requires. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1976). By filling out the
statements, the applicant would create a financial profile that courts could use to review the
in forma pauperis petition. Under § 1915, courts already must review the pauper petitions
on a case-by-case basis. If the court grants the litigant pauper status and the litigant is un-
successful, the court can determine the proportion of costs the court should assess against
the indigent, if any, on the basis of the indigent litigant's financial profile.
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an indigent's right to equal access to the courts. 5 Partial payment would
require the indigent to evaluate the relative merits of his claim. Because
courts already consider an applicant's affidavit of indigency on an in-
dividual basis, instituting standards of partial payment would not over-
burden the courts.88
RICHARD LEAR
B. Injunction Modification Standards: Uniformity v. Flexibility
Injunctions are equitable remedies designed to protect rights, to en-
force obligations, and to prevent wrongs for which no adequate remedy
at law exists.' In issuing an injunction a court attempts to devise an ap-
propriate response to the commission of a wrong by entering either a
preventive or protective order.2 A permanent injunction is a final
remedy, obtained after a full hearing on the merits of a particular case.'
The term permanent is illusory, however, because permanent injunc-
tions are subject to modification or dissolution.4 A permanent injunction
See text accompanying notes 75-79 supra.
88 See text accompanying note 77 supra; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1976).
4 POMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1338 (5th ed. 1941) [hereinafter cited as
POMEROY]. Due to considerations of expediency and convenience of both potential litigants
and the judicial system itself, equitable remedies are applicable to only those cases in which
legal remedies would be neither full nor adequate. Id. Equity, in its substantive aspect, con-
sists of a body of principles dedicated to the same basic notions of justice that courts of law
traditionally applied. R. NEWMAN, EQUITY AND LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 11 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as EQUITY]. The principles of equity extend beyond the legal notions of
justice to provide relief from hardship when the law cannot act. Id. at 11. The doctrine of
equity emerged in England in the fourteenth century as a means to avoid the strict pro-
cedural requirements of early law which left little room for adaptation to individual hard-
ship. Id. at 12-13, 25. The Office of the Chancellor of England provided the necessary ex-
ecutive authority to establish equity as a separate and viable system of justice. Id. at 22.
Equity emerged as a flexible doctrine that supplements the law by applying considerations
of what is fair and just. Id. at 11.
2 POMEROY, supra note 1, § 1337. Injunctions may be either mandatory or prohibitory
in nature. W. DEFUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY 15 (2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as
HANDBOOK]. Mandatory injunctions compel action. Id. Prohibitory injunctions forbid action.
Id.; see Steinberg, SEC And Other Permanent Injunctions-Standards For Their Imposi-
tion, Modification and Dissolution, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 27, 28-29 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Steinberg]; note 4 infra (equitable nature of injunctions).
I HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 17. Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L.
REV. 994, 1055 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Developments]. Injunctions may be either
preliminary or permanent. POMEROY, supra note 1, § 1337. A preliminary injunction is a
form of interlocutory relief granted while a suit is pending. Id. Litigants may obtain
preliminary injunctions ex parte, or after a truncated hearing that forces a judge to render
a decision based only on condensed versions of each party's position. Developments, supra,
at 1055.
4 See HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 17; Steinberg, supra note 2, at 41-73; Developments,
supra note 3, at 1080-86. The justification for altering permanent injunctions stems from the
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is, therefore, a dynamic remedy over which courts necessarily retain
jurisdiction in order to modify the injunction as equity demands.5 Never-
theless, because some measure of finality for injunctions is desirable, the
legal doctrine of res judicata extends to equitable decrees., Res judicata
fosters reliance on judicial economy and avoids inconsistent results by
giving judgments finality.7 The rules governing the application of res
judicata balance the judicial system's desire for finality with its need for
flexibility.' The interrelation between the dynamic nature of the injunc-
tive remedy and the need for finality in judicial actions was an important
consideration for the United States Supreme Court when it formulated
the guidelines for injunction modification in United States v. Swift & Co.
(Swift),
In Swift, the Court considered the propriety of modifying an injunc-
tion issued twelve years earlier.10 The order enjoined the Swift Com-
pany, a meat packer, from dealing with certain food products, and from
cooperating with four other companies to form a monopoly of the nation's
food packing and distributing industries. Swift argued that during the
equitable nature of the remedy itself. See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944)
(essence of equity is courts' power to mould decrees to necessities of each case). Courts must
tailor the provisions of a particular injunction to fit the requirements of the particular fac-
tual setting of a dispute. See id The logical consequence of an equitable remedy includes
the need to change the terms of the remedy as changes occur in the factual setting giving
rise to that remedy. D. DOBBS, REMEDIES 111 (1973).
Santa Rita Oil Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 112 Mont. 359, - , 116 P.2d 1012,
1017 (1941); see United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114-15 (1932); Developments,
supra note 3, at 1080. Justice Frankfurter once stated that an injunction is "'permanent' only
for the temporary period for which it may last." Milk Wagon Drivers Union Local 753 v.
Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 298 (1941).
Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure codifies the common law authority
of courts to modify injunctions. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). Under Rule 60(b)(5), federal courts
have the power to grant partial or total relief in injunction cases through modification or
dissolution if it is no longer equitable that the injunction continue. Id.
' System Fed'n No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 647-48 (1961); see Developments,
supra note 3, at 1080-81. Res judicata is a principle of law that does not permit relitigation of
causes of action once a court has specifically determined the rights of the parties involved in
the suit. See Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REV. 818, 824-25 (1952)
[hereinafter cited as Res Judicata].
7 Res Judicata, supra note 6, at 820.
Id
O 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
10 Id. at 114-20.
1 Id. at 109-11. In Swift, the United States government obtained an injunction against
Swift to dissolve a monopoly created by Swift in conjunction with four other meat-
packaging companies in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Id; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1976). By concert of action, the five meat packers had suppressed competition in the pur-
chase of both livestock and prepared meats and were moving to extend their operations in
order to control other areas of the food industry as well. 286 U.S. at 110. The decree,
entered on February 27, 1920, enjoined the defendants from maintaining a monopoly and
continuing any alliance in restraint of trade. Id. at 111. The decree also enjoined the defen-
dants, both jointly and severally, from dealing in either the wholesale or retail markets for
many categories of food products. Id
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twelve year period since the injunction took effect, substantial changes
had taken place in the food industry rendering the injunctive restraints
unwarranted and oppressive. 2 In considering Swift's argument, the
Court developed a strict standard for determining when modification is
appropriate." Modification may occur when a change in law or fact has
occurred that has substantially reduced the dangers that prompted the
original injunction." In addition, there must be a showing that continu-
ance of the injunction would constitute extreme hardship for the enjoin-
ed party. 5 The Court held modification of the injunction inappropriate
because the rise in the power of chain stores did not alter the food
marketing system to the degree necessary to eradicate the possibility of
Swift's future industry domination."8
Recently, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the Swift
standard of injunction modification in the context of a trademark in-
fringement suit, Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inn. 7 Holiday Inns was the
latest appeal in a series of suits between the nationally operated motel
chain and a locally owned motel operating under the same name in Myr-
tle Beach, South Carolina. 8
Holiday Inns of America (the chain) became a corporation in 1952."g
The United States Patent and Trademark Office registered the com-
12 See id. at 113. After issuance of the injunction in Swift, the Swift Company remained
in the food industry as a wholesale meat-packer. Id. at 117. The injunction had been suc-
cessful in accomplishing change in the meat business. Id. The Supreme Court conceded that
there was little likelihood of monopoly recurring in the meat industry because several of the
original defendants were no longer operating. Id. at 113, 117. Changes had occurred in the
retail sale of groceries as well. Id. at 118. The chain store had attained increased pro-
minence since 1920. Id.
13 See id at 119-20.
Id. at 119. In Swift, the Supreme Court emphasized that courts have the power to
modify injunctions. Id. at 114. Justice Cardozo, writing for the majority, pointed out that in-
junctions are continuing decrees subject to adaptation as events may shape the need. Id.
Federal circuit courts have held that changes in operative facts, relevant decisional law, or
applicable statutory law are significant in determining the appropriateness of injunction
modification. See Flavor Corp. of America v. Kemin Indus., Inc., 503 F.2d 729, 732 (8th Cir.
1974); King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 418 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1969).
15 286 U.S. at 119.
16 Id In Swift, the Supreme Court weighed changes in the food industry to determine
if they met the standard of substantial danger reduction. Id. at 117-19. The Court firmly
believed that the danger of industry domination still existed with respect to the forbidden
grocery business. Id at 118. The Court reasoned that grocery chains to which Swift sold did
not produce the food they marketed, but depended on Swift for meat products and would
turn to Swift for other items if the court granted modification. Id. The Court also considered
the Swift Company's potential for future abuse in light of its past actions and the possible
hardship the Company would suffer if modification of the injunction did not occur. Id. at
114-19. Swift remained a powerful force in the meat packing industry and, therefore, easily
could have resumed its domination of the grocery business. Id.
'" 645 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 102 S. Ct. 597 (1982).
18 See id. at 242-43; text accompanying notes 29-44 infra.
" 645 F.2d at 241.
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pany's distinctive "Holiday Inn" service marks two years later." The
local establishment (the local) had been operating under the Holiday Inn
name since 1949, but had failed to register its use of that name as a pro-
tected service mark.2 Tension between the parties began in 1956 when
the chain authorized construction of a franchise facility in Myrtle Beach.
2
2
The local objected to the chain's projected use of the name Holiday Inn,
and so, with the permission of the chain, the franchise began operations
as the "Holiday Lodge."'
Despite the local's concern for its own rights, it proceeded from the
start to capitalize on the goodwill and national reputation of Holiday
Inns of America. 24 The local adopted a slogan similar to the chain's
slogan," constructed a sign nearly identical to the Holiday Inn great
sign,26 advertised its name in the same style script,8 and often used
towels and other guest room supplies that bore the insignia "Holiday Inn
® "28
2* See id. The Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976), governs
trademark registration. Id. § 1114(1). The Act provides that the United States Patent and
Trademark Office has the authority to register patents and trademarks. Id. § 1051. Section
1051 sets out the registration procedure, while § 1057(a) covers the form of the registration
certificate. Id. §§ 1051 & 1057(a). In trademark law, under § 1057(b), a registration cer-
tificate is prima facie evidence of a user's exclusive right to a particular mark. Id. § 1057(b).
The major policy of the Lanham Act is to protect a single user's right to a specific mark. See
H. TOULMiN, TRADEMARK ACT OF 1946 4-7 (1946) [hereinafter cited as TOULMIN]. Protection of
a trademark accomplishes two purposes. See id. at 4. First, a registered trademark protects
the user's investment in a particular mark by assuring that any money or time expended to
promote a mark and a product's reputation through advertisement will be part of a worth-
while effort. Id. Second, the public receives protection from deception. Id. Consumers will
come to associate certain marks with the quality of certain products or services in which
they have confidence. Id.
21 645 F.2d at 242-43 (Phillips, J., dissenting). In Holiday Inns, the local motel's failure
to register its mark is an important factor because although the local was the first user of
the name Holiday Inn, the chain had a registration certificate, which is prima facie evidence
of an exclusive right to the name. See id..; note 20 supra and note 28 infra.
I See Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inn, 364 F. Supp. 775,778 (D.S.C. 1973), affd mem.,
498 F.2d 1397 (4th Cir. 1974).
2 Id.
I Id. at 782-83.
25 Id. In Holiday Inns, the chain registered the slogan, "Your Host From Coast to
Coast," while the local used, "Your Host on the Coast" and "Your Host While in Myrtle
Beach." Id. at 776, 779.
21 645 F.2d at 241. A great sign serves as the major identifying feature of each Holiday
Inn facility. See 364 F. Supp. at 777. In Holiday Inns, even the managerlowner of the local
could not identify any differences between the great sign and the sign erected to indicate
the local motel's location until he examined photographs of each. 645 F.2d at 241.
" 645 F.2d at 241. The chain, in Holiday Inns, had registered its name in a distinctive
style of script so as to make its name readily identifiable. Id.
2 Id. The use of the symbol ® serves as notice that a mark is duly registered with the
United States Patent and Trademark Office. 15 U.S.C. § 1111 (1976). The symbol stands for
the phrases, "Registered in U.S. Patent and Trademark Office" or "Reg. U.S. Pat. Off." Id
Failure to give notice of registration in the proper fashion precludes any recovery of profits
or damages in subsequent trademark suits. Id. The right to use the symbol issues upon any
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In 1970, the chain brought suit against the local for trademark in-
fringement and unfair competition when the local began efforts to obtain
registration of the Holiday Inn mark.' The district court found that the
local, notwithstanding its prior use of the Holiday Inn name, had engaged
in several acts of unfair competition." The court issued an injunction
designed to accommodate the rights of both parties. 1 Under the injunc-
tion, the local could continue using the Holiday Inn name in advertising,
provided that the name appear only in plain block lettering.32 The injunc-
tion deprived the local, however, of the use of the symbol ® in conjunc-
tion with its name.3 In an immediate appeal of the injunction, the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court's order.'
Refusing to be denied the rights of registration as the entitled first
user of the Holiday Inn name,-5 the local resumed a previously suspended
concurrent use proceeding with the United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office. 8 The proceeding sought to obtain concurrent registration
privileges pursuant to the Lanham Trademark Act of 194611 since the
local believed that it had a valid and simultaneous right to register the
Holiday Inn name. 8 The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board denied con-
valid registration. Id. The local had violated § 1111, therefore, by using the symbol ® before
gaining registration privileges. See 645 F.2d at 241.
645 F.2d at 243 (Phillips, J., dissenting); see Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inn, 364 F.
Supp. 775, 776 (D.S.C. 1973); notes 37-41 infra.
364 F. Supp. at 783; see text accompanying notes 24-28 supra.
31 364 F. Supp. at 786-87.
Id The district court in Holiday Inns ordered the chain to continue operating its
Myrtle Beach facilities as Holiday Lodge and Holiday Downtown in order to protect the
rights of the local motel's prior use of the name Holiday Inn. Id. at 787.
1 See id. at 786-87. The district court's order in Holidiay Inns enjoined the local from:
(a) using in its advertising a script similar to the chain's distinctive script; (b) using any sign
similar to the chain's great sign; (c) using any slogan similar to the chain's registered slogan;
(d) using any indicia of the chain that might have suggested the local had a connection with
Holiday Inns, Inc.; (e) using any indication that the United States Patent and Trademark Of-
fice had registered its name; (f) doing anything that tended to divest the chain of the good
will it had acquired in its registered marks. Id
Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inn, 498 F.2d 1397 (4th Cir. 1974).
The local in Holiday Inns derived the name Holiday Inn from a Bing Crosby movie
entitled "White Christmas" in 1949. Holiday Inns, Inc., however, did not begin to use the
name until its incorporation in 1952. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inn, 364 F. Supp. 775, 778
(D.S.C. 1973); see text accompanying notes 19-23 supra.
645 F.2d at 243 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976); see note 20 supra.
645 F.2d at 243 (Phillips, J., dissenting). Concurrent registration is an unusual aspect
of trademark law in that it undermines the policy of trademark law, which seeks to protect
a single user's right to a specific mark. See note 20 supra. The concurrent registration pro-
vision in the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1976), however, codifies the preference accorded
to prior users at common law and attempts to provide an equitable solution to the difficult
problem presented when two innocent users have both acquired rights in the same or
similar marks. See TOULMn, supra note 20, at 1-5. Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act provides
that simultaneous users of a trademark in diverse geographical areas can sometimes
register the same mark as concurrent users. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1976). The United States
Patent and Trademark Office will issue concurrent registration unless the second mark's
registration is likely to cause confusion or deception. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1976). Concur-
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current registration. 9 On appeal, however, the Court of Customs and Pa-
tent Appeals granted concurrent registration within the confines of the
previously issued injunction The court also indicated, sua sponte, that
the injunction should be modified in order to allow the local to use the
symbol ® as evidence of its newly registered mark.4'
Subsequently, the local sought injunction modification in the United
States District Court for the District of South Carolina on the grounds
that the patent appeals court's decision to grant concurrent registration
represented a substantial change in circumstances that warranted
changing the injunction's provisions to permit use of the symbol ® .42 The
district court refused to modify the injunction.43 In upholding the district
court's decision, the Fourth Circuit relied extensively on Swift and con-
sidered the quality of the alleged change in circumstance, the potential
rent registration can also issue if a court 6f competent jurisdiction finally has determined
that more than one user is entitled to use the same or similar marks in commerce. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(d) (1976). The local instituted a concurrent use proceeding in 1970, but the Patent and
Trademark Office suspended determination of the validity of the local's right to obtain con-
current registration pending outcome of the trademark infringement action filed against the
local by Holiday Inns of America, Inc. 645 F.2d at 243.
Holiday Inn v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 188 U.S.P.Q. 471, 473 (1975). The Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board denied concurrent registration under § 2(d) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(d) (1976), which permits concurrent registration only when there is no likelihood of
confusion. 188 U.S.P.Q. at 472; see note 38 supra. The Board found that a likelihood of confu-
sion existed due to the fact that the chain operated several facilities under the name Holi-
day Inn in close proximity to the local. 188 U.S.P.Q. at 472.
40 Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inn, 534 F.2d 312, 318-20 (C.C.P.A. 1976). The basis for
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals' decision to grant concurrent registration was the
last provision of § 2(d) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1976). Section g(d) permits
concurrent registration regardless of the likelihood of public confusion in identifying the
source of purchased goods or services if a court of competent jurisdiction had determined a
party's right to use the same or similar mark in commerce. Id.; see note 38 supra. The court
seized upon the Fourth Circuit's determination that the'local could continue using the name
Holiday Inn to justify granting concurrent registration. See 534 F.2d 312, 318-20; Holiday
Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inn, 364 F. Supp. 775, 787 (D.S.C. 1973).
41 534 F.2d 312, 319. In its Holiday Inns decision, the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals noted that the injunction provision that prohibited the local from using any indication
of registration, see note 32 supra, was appropriate while the local did not have a valid
registration of its mark. Id In view of the fact that any valid registration confers the right
to use the symbol ® , 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1976), the patent appeals court could find no further
reason to deny that right to the local. 534 F.2d at 319.
" 645 F.2d at 240. The opinion of the district court to which the local originally applied
for injunction modification is in an unpublished decision. Id. at 240 n.3. The Fourth Circuit
quoted from the district court's unpublished opinion to explain the lower court's rationale
for refusing to modify the injunction. Id. at 242. The district court concluded that the local
would derive little, if any, practical benefit from use of the symbol ® .Id. In addition, the
local's efforts to identify itself with the national chain deliberately nurtured the public's con-
fusion. Id Finally, in view of the fact that the local's business had not suffered from denial
of the use of the symbol ® during the last six years, the court held that the local did not ex-
perience hardship to the degree of oppression as supposedly required by Swift. See id.;
United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932); text accompanying notes 9-16 supra.
645 F.2d at 242.
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for future abuse by the local, and the degree of hardship the local would
suffer if the court denied injunction modification."
The Fourth Circuit underscored the local's past efforts at gleaning
benefits from the chain's status as a well-known and reputable establish-
ment.45 In view of the local's past behavior in trying to identify itself
with the chain, the court concluded that the local's potential for future
abuse was considerable if the chain's trademarks lost their potency
through duplication.46 In addition, the Holiday Inns court rejected the
possibility that the local would suffer any extreme hardship if the
original injunction remained in force. 7 The court observed briefly that
the local's business had not suffered from competition with the chain in
the past, and would not suffer in the future if denied the use of the sym-
bol ® .11 In essence, the court maintained that the injunction's purpose
was to prevent the local from profiting from the traveling public's confu-
sion between the chain and the local.49 The Holiday Inns court found
that, notwithstanding the patent appeals court's ruling, modification
would increase the level of confusion between the motels and, perhaps,
heighten the possibility of future acts of unfair competition by the local.
According to the Fourth Circuit, therefore, the change of circumstance
neither substantially reduced the dangers that originally prompted the
injunction, nor created a hardship that amounted to oppression.51
The Holiday Inns dissent argued that the majority's rigid construc-
tion of the Swift Court's language was not in accord with the intended
teaching of that case." According to the dissent, the majority failed to
consider subsequent Supreme Court opinions that limited the rigid
modification rule to cases as serious as Swift.' The dissent pointed out
that the Swift Company's efforts at establishing a monopoly in the food
industry had significantly affected the nation's economy." The dissent
maintained that a rigid construction of Swift is necessary only when the
" See id. at 240-42; text accompanying notes 9-16 supra.
,5 645 F.2d at 242; see text accompanying notes 24-28 supra.
,' 645 F.2d at 242.
Id. The Fourth Circuit in Holiday Inns concluded that the local would not suffer any
hardship from denial of the use of the symbol ® . Id. The Holiday Inns court, in concluding
that no economic hardship would result from denial of the use of the symbol ® , failed to
discuss the fact that the Lanham Act requires trademark registrants to give public notice of
registration as a prerequisite to the recovery of damages in any subsequent infringement
suits. See 15 U.S.C. § 1111 (1976). The local, therefore, could not recover damages in any
subsequent trademark suit with another competitor. See note 28 supra.
" 645 F.2d at 241-42.
Id. at 242; see text accompanying notes 24-28 supra.
51 Id.; see text accompanying notes 12-15 supra.
645 F.2d at 245 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
Id. at 244-45; see United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 248 (1968);
System Fed'n No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 647 (1961); note 68 infra.
" 645 F.2d at 245 (Phillips, J., dissenting); see text accompanying notes 9-16 supra.
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facts of a particular case involve the same level of wrong-doing perpe-
trated by the Swift Company when it attempted to dominate one of the
nation's essential industries&w The dissent distinguished Swift from Holi-
day Inns on this impact basis.' The local inn's wrong-doing affected only
the tourists and town of Myrtle Beach, not the entire nation's economy
as did the defendant's activity in Swift6 7 In a situation of limited effect,
the dissent claimed the Swift rule encourages flexibility in injunction
modification in order to assure that courts equitably resolve modifica-
tion questions&w
The dissent suggested that courts can best-achieve flexibility by
balancing the danger of potential hardship if modification does not occur,
against the continuing need and viability of the original injunction 9 In
applying the balancing test to the instant case, the dissent concluded
that it was unlikely that use of the symbol ® by the local would increase
confusion beyond the level created by six -years of legally approved,
though not officially registered, concurrent use of the Holiday Inn
name." The dissent contended that the majority's denial of modification
relief nullified the local's legal right to registration and constituted a
hardship that far outweighed the need to maintain an injunction provi-
sion that, as a practical matter, did little to decrease public confusion
between the local and Holiday Inns of America. 1 The dissent, therefore,
would have modified the injunction.2
While courts generally look to Swift for guidance in devising stan-
dards for when injunction modification is appropriate,6 the courts have
split in interpreting the meaning of the Swift rule." Some courts adhere
strictly to the language utilized by the Swift Court and modify injunc-
tions only when a substantial change in circumstance has occurred,
coupled with a showing that nonmodification would result in extreme
hardship for the enjoined party. 5 Other courts have developed a flexible
645 F.2d at 245 (Phillips, J., dissenting); see text accompanying notes 9-16 supra and
notes 66-75 infra.
N 645 F.2d at 244-46 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
', Id. at 245-46.
N Id. at 245. The Swift Court stated that if a court is satisfied that changing cir-
cumstances have turned an injunction into an instrument of wrong, the court can modify the
injunction accordingly. 286 U.S. at 114-15; see generally text accompanying notes 1-5 supra.
59 See 645 F.2d at 245 (Phillips, J., dissenting); Steinberg, supra note 2, at 59; text ac-
companying notes 66-76 infra.
e 645 F.2d at 247 (Phillips, J., dissenting); see text accompanying notes 32-33 supra.
61 645 F.2d at 248 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
8Id.
See, e.g., SEC v. Warren, 583 F.2d 115, 120-22 (3d Cir. 1978); De Filippis v. United
States, 567 F.2d 341, 344 (7th Cir' 1977); King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc.,
418 F.2d 31, 33-35 (2d Cir. 1969); notes 65-66 infra. See generally Steinberg, supra note 2, at
41-51.
See Steinberg, supra note 2, at 41-51.
See 286 U.S. at 119; De Filippis v. United States, 567 F.2d 341, 344 (7th Cir. 1977) (no
modification of injunction that ended Marine policy against short wigs worn by Marines
when another case upheld similarly short hair standards for policemen without wigs); Ridley
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standard and resolve the issue of injunction, modification by examining
the particular facts and setting of each case, rather than by applying a
uniform standard." A 1968 Supreme Court decision, United States v.
United Shoe Machinery Corp. (United Shoe),7 lends support to the cir-
cuits that have applied the flexible approach. The United Shoe Court
considered the appropriateness of modifying an injunction that was not
effectively achieving the intended goal of eliminating a single corpora-
tion's domination of the shoe machinery manufacturing industry.8 The
Supreme Court modified the injunction and distinguished Swift on the
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 427 F.2d 19,22 (10th Cir. 1970) (alleged changes in natural gas sup-
ply did not warrant modification of injunction forcing oil company to supply customer with
gas); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. American Oil Co., 405 F.2d 803, 813 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 905 (1969) (no modification of injunction restricting trademark use despite showing
that mark had begun to receive widespread and nonexclusive usage). But see Coca-Cola Co.
v. Standard Bottling Co., 138 F.2d 788, 790 (10th Cir. 1943) (even under Swift, injunction en-
joining Standard from selling cola products dissolved when shown that many courts had
determined Coca-Cola has no exclusive right to market cola products). The Eighth Circuit in
Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. American Oil Co., refused to modify an injunction that restrained
three oil companies from using certain trademarks in their gasoline business. 405 F.2d at
821. The companies had argued that modification was permissible because under the pres-
ent facts and widespread use of the trademarks in question, the original injunction was no
longer necessary. See id. at 811-14. The Humble Oil court rejected the company's argument
and reiterated the Swift language, concluding that injunction modification is proper only if
substantial change and unforeseeable hardship has occurred to the plaintiff. Id. at 813.
" See SEC v. Warren, 583 F.2d 115, 120-22 (3d Cir. 1978); King-Seeley Thermos Co. v.
Aladdin Indus., Inc., 418 F.2d 31, 33-35 (2d Cir. 1969); text accompanying notes 52-59 supra.
In Warren, the court modified an injunction restraining an individual from further viola-
tions of the margin requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1933. 583 F.2d at 122.
The court declared that the types of conduct involved in Warren and Swift differed greatly.
Id. at 120. Warren involved a single isolated offense in an esoteric area of the law, whereas
Swift involved monopolistic conduct affecting the entire nation. See id. at 120-21. Further-
more, the defendant in Warren scrupulously obeyed the injunction order for a period of
years. Id.
In King-Seeley, the Aladdin Company sought modification of an injunction preventing
it from using the term "thermos" which King-Seeley had registered as part of its
trademark. 418 F.2d at 33. The Second Circuit granted modification in view of the growing
generic nature of the term. Id. at 35. In so doing, the court carefully distinguished Swift by
stating that the case before it did not present a sharp conflict between right and wrong as in
Swift, but the King-Seeley case presented a need for drawing the line between two kinds of
right-doing. See id. Both companies thus had valid claims and the court found it necessary
to balance the competing interests in determining the appropriateness of injunction
modification. Id.
n 391 U.S. 244 (1968).
" See id. at 246-48. In United Shoe, the government sought modification of an injunc-
tion originally issued against the defendant corporation as a means to break up a monopoly
in the shoe machinery manufacturing business. Id. at 247. The injunction decree contained a
provision allowing either party to petition for modification after ten years. Id. at 246. The
court imposed the ten year period to allow the injunction's provisions time to prove their ef-
fectiveness. Id. The government accordingly petitioned for modification, reporting that
United Shoe continued to dominate the shoe machinery market and that the decree had not
established workable competition. Id. The government again requested a division of the
corporation into competing companies. Id. The district court denied the motion, relying on
Swift to support the conclusion that modification was inappropriate unless new and unfore-
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ground of the procedurally protracted and substantively grave nature of
the Swift litigation. 9 The United Shoe Court concluded that modification
depends on an appropriate showing based on the specific facts and cir-
cumstances of each case."0 The Supreme Court's United Shoe decision
eased the Swift rule by sanctioning a close scrutiny of the facts and cir-
cumstances of a case. 1 The case-by-case analysis serves as an alternative
standard for determining the appropriateness of injunction modification
in cases of less serious national impact than Swift.
7 2
The Fourth Circuit has demonstrated an equally flexible approach to
the question of injunction modification. In Tobin v. Alma Mills,
' the
Secretary of Labor brought suit against Alma Mills to enjoin future vio-
lations of the Fair Labor Standards Act.' The company applied for dis-
solution of the injunction nine years later, arguing that its long-standing
compliance with the order was evidence of its good faith and constituted
a change that warranted modification.7 5 The Fourth Circuit agreed, and
distinguished Swift by underscoring the absurdity of literally applying
language clearly intended to cover the particular fact situation found in
the Swift case'
United Shoe and Alma Mills, therefore, provided the Fourth Circuit
with an alternative standard to Swift for determining the appropriate-
ness of the local's modification request since Holiday Inns did not have
seen conditions had developed. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 266 F. Supp.
328, 330 (D. Mass. 1967). The Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision, stating
that the lower court had misconstrued the meaning of Swift. 391 U.S. at 248. The Court
pointed to Swift's numerous attempts to have the injunction order vacated as an illustration
of the Swift Company's potential for future abuse, and stated that Swift must be read in the
light of this factual context. Id. at 248.
Another Supreme Court case indicating that the language of Swift did not establish an
inflexible rule is System Fed'n No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642 (1961). In System Fed', peti-
tioner labor union sought to dissolve an injunction enjoining the union from discriminating
against nonunion workers. Id. at 644-45. The authority for the injunction was § 2 of the
Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1976)),
which prohibited mandatory union membership requirements. See 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1976).
Congress later amended the act to allow contracts that required the existence of a union
shop. See 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended by Act of Jan. 10, 1951, Pub. L. 914, 64 Stat. 1238
(1951) (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1976)). The union based its argument for modifica-
tion on the change in law. See 364 U.S. at 644-45. The Court in granting modification did not
follow a rigid construction of Swift's standard for modification. See id at 650-51. Rather, the
System Fed'n Court stated that sound judicial discretion calls for the modification of injunc-
tions if circumstances of law or fact existing at the time of issuance have changed, or if new
factors have arisen. 364 U.S. at 647.
69 391 U.S. at 248; see generally text accompanying notes 9-16 supra.
70 391 U.S. at 249.
71 See id
" See id.; Steinberg, supra note 2, at 47-51; notes 67-68 supra.
73 192 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1951), cert denied, 343 U.S. 933 (1952).
,, Id. at 134; see 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976).
, See id. But see Mayberry v. Maroney, 558 F.2d 1159, 1164 (3d Cir. 1977) (stating that
compliance with injunction insufficient grounds for modification).
"' 192 F.2d at 136.
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the same degree of nationwide significance as did Swift.7 The Holiday
Inns court adhered to the strict Swift rule, however, presumably due to
the unusual facts surrounding the local's request for relief.7" The Fourth
Circuit originally upheld the injunction as the proper means to prevent
public confusion between the local and Holiday Inns of America." The
Fourth Circuit may have believed that, by granting concurrent registra-
tion, the patent appeals court had adhered to the language of the
Lanham Act but failed to recognize that the intended purpose of the
Act's concurrent registration provision was to avoid the possibility of
confusion." The Holiday Inns court, therefore, refused to foster confu-
sion by modifying the injunction. 1
Had the Fourth Circuit applied the balancing approach advocated by
the dissent, however, the court could have avoided contributing to confu-
sion without relying on the stringent Swift rule. Although the dissent
would have modified the injunction,82 a balancing test on the Holiday
Inns facts does not compel necessarily injunction modification. The
degree of potential harm in deciding to modify the injunction was rela-
tively equal with the degree of potential hardship the local would suffer
if modification did not occur. 3 The local's use of the symbol ® was not
likely to cause more confusion than already existed through both parties'
simultaneous use of the name Holiday Inn.84 The only practical benefit,
however, that use of the registration symbol could bring to the local was
the right to recover damages in subsequent trademark infringement ac-
tions. 5 In view of the fact that Myrtle Beach has an abundant supply of
Holiday Inns, it is unlikely that another competitor would involve the
local in litigation to protect the Holiday Ikn mark.8 Thus, on the Holiday
Inns facts, the court could have reached the same result using the balanc-
ing test rather than the Swift analysis.
In most cases a balancing test is a more appropriate standard for in-
junction modification since flexibility is of prime importance in equitable
remedies.87 While the Holiday Inns decision suggests that future
modification requests in the Fourth Circuit will be subject to Swift's
rigid standard, the court could'return to the more flexible balancing ap-
proach it demonstrated in Alma Mills.8" The future application of the
7 See text accompanying notes 54-57 and 65-76 supra.
' See 645 F.2d at 241-42; text accompanying notes 35-41 supra.
See 645 F.2d at 242; 364 F. Supp. at 786-87; text accompanying notes 44-51 supra.
'o See 4 R. CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 98.3(b)(1) at
133 (3d ed. Supp. 1981). See generally text accompanying notes 17-51 supra.
" See 645 F.2d at 242.
Id at 248 (Phillips, J., dissenting); see text accompanying notes 52-62 supra.
See 645 F.2d at 242.
Id at 247 (Phillips, J., dissenting); see text accompanying notes 60-62 supra.
645 F.2d at 244 (Phillips, J., dissenting); see text accompanying notes 28"& 48 supra.
See 364 F. Supp. at 780. The town and tourists of Myrtle Beach, South Carolina sup-
ported three authorized Holiday Inn franchises located at different parts of the city. See id.
See text accompanying notes 1 & 4-5 supra.
See text accompanying notes 73-76 supra.
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strict Swift rule may depend on the seriousness or the complexity of the
fact situation underlying a modification request. An attorney in the
Fourth Circuit, however, must be prepared to meet either the rigid
Swift rule or the flexible Alma Mills test when requesting an injunction
modification.
LEIGH ANN GALBRAITH
C. Res Judicata" Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction
and State Court Consent Judgments
The doctrine of res Judicata rests upon considerations of economy of
judicial time and a public policy favoring the establishment of certainty
in legal relations.1 Res judicata prevents repetitious litigation by render--
ing a final judgment on the merits a bar to a subsequent action upon the
same claim between the same parties or those in privity with the par-
ties.' Res judicata and the full faith and credit clause of the United
I See Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948). Res judicata is a doctrine of
judicial origin. See id. The doctrine prevents repetitious litigation involving the same cause
of action, and provides a point at which litigation ends. See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127,
131 (1979); Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525 (1931); Norman
Tobacco & Candy Co. v. Gillette Safety Razor Co., 295 F.2d 362, 364 (5th Cir. 1961). Res
judicata ensures efficient use of a court's time through avoidance of needless litigation. See
Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 192-93 (1947). Res judicata also prevents harassment of a
defendant. See White v. Adler, 289 N.Y. 34, 42-43, 43 N.E.2d 798, 801-02 (1942). The doctrine
binds the original parties and those in privity with them not only on every matter actually
litigated in the first claim, but also on any other admissible matter that a party might have
offered to sustain or defeat the first claim. See Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597
(1948); Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876). See geneiully, 1B MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.405[1], 621-29 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as 1B MOORE]; Note,
Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. REV 818, 820-22 (1952).
2 See Brown v. Fesen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979) (final judgment on merits bars further
claims based on same cause of action by parties or parties in privity); Mont. v. United
States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979) (right, question or fact determined by court of competent-
jurisdiction cannot be disputed in subsequent suit between same parties or parties in privi-
ty); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 & n.5 (1979) (res judicata protects par-
ties from relitigating identical issues); Hart Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply Co., 244 U.S. 294,
299 (1917) (those bound by court judgment should recognize rights established by such judg-
ment); Liddell v. Smith, 345 F.2d 491, 493 (7th Cir. 1965) (public policy of res judicata re-
quires end to litigation); Bennett v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 837, 839 (5th Cir. 1940) (res
judicata rests on public policy to end litigation); Opelousas-St. Landry Sec. Co. v. United
States, 66 F.2d 41, 44 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 684 (1933) (res judicata ends con-
troversies); 1B MOORE, supra note 1, at 628 n.27. See generally Currie, Res Judicata- The
Neglected Defense, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 325 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Currie] (policy of
res judicata is to end litigation); Note, 'To Bind or Not to Bind'" Bar and Merger Treatment
of Consent Decrees in Patent Infringement Litigation, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1322, 1322 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as "To Bind or Not To Bind"] (res judicata discourages repetitive litiga-
tion).
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States Constitution3 generally require that a state court's final judgment
on the merits bar a federal court from entertaining a succeeding action
on the same claim between the same parties or those in privity with
them.4 The general requirement barring relitigation, however, is not ab-
solute.' Federal courts adjudicate some cases which federal statutes
restrict to the federal judicial system.' When a prior state court judg-
ment bars an action that a federal statute restricts to a federal forum
the policies of exclusive federal jurisdiction' may compete with the
, See U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 1. The full faith and credit clause of the United States Con-
stitution and its concomitant implementing statute, 28 U.S.C. 1738 (1976), generally require
a federal court to give the same res judicata effect to a state court action as the state court
itself would give to the same action. See Boothe v. Baker Indus., Inc., 262 F. Supp. 168, 173
(D. Del. 1966). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 86 (Final Draft); Cassad, In-
tersystem Issue Preclusion and the Restatement (Second of Judgments, 66 CORNELL L.
REV. 510, 519 (1981); Note, The Preclusive Effect of State Judgments on Subsequent 1983
Actions, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 610, 610 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1983 Actions].
See American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 166 (1932) (full faith and credit
clause applies to state court judicial proceedings questioned in an independent federal court
proceeding); Gart v. Cole, 263 F.2d 244, 248 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 978 (1959) (full
faith and credit requires federal court to bar relitigation of state court decision).
' See American Mannex Corp. v. Rozands, 462 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1040 (1972) (states interpretation of res judicata not necessarily binding on federal
court); Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Mkts. v. Louisiana Milk Comm'n, 365 F. Supp. 1144,
1147 (M.D. La. 1973), affd, 416 U.S. 922 (1974) (federal court to give great consideration to
state interpretation of res judicata but does not bind court); note 71 infra.
' See Note, Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in Private Civil Actions, 70
HARV. L. REV. 509, 509-14 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Edclusive Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts]. Federal courts have limited jurisdiction. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport
Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981); 1 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.6011], 603 (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as 1 MOORE]. Federal courts, as courts of limited
jurisdiction generally do not review determinations of state courts. See Mitchell v. National
Broadcasting Co., 553 F.2d 265, 274 (2d Cir. 1977); Bricker v. Crane, 468 F.2d 1228, 1231-32
(1st Cir. 1972), cert denied, 410 U.S. 930 (1973). Parties normally appeal judgments of state
trial courts to state appellate courts and then to the United States Supreme Court. See
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923); Chang, Rediscovering the Rooker
Doctrine: Section 1983, Res Judicata and the Federal Courts, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1337, 1342
(1980). See generally, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Vestal, State Court Judgment as Preclusive
in Section 1983 Litigation in a Federal Court, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 185, 187 (1974). The United
States Constitution gives Congress power to confer jurisdiction on lower federal courts.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Cary v. Curtis, 15 U.S. (3 How.) 409, 416 (1844). Congress generally
has vested state and federal courts with concurrent jurisdiction, and federal statutes con-
taining no contrary provision allow state courts to exercise concurrent jurisdiction. See The
Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 429-30 (1866); 1 MOORE, supra at 0.06[1], 603; Exclusive
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, supra, at 509. Federal courts, however, have exclusive
jurisdiction in several areas. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976) (securities regulation); 28 U.S.C. §§
1333 (admiralty), 1334 (bankruptcy), 1338 (1976) (patents, copyrights, trademarks, and unfair
competition).
' See Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 464 F. Supp. 1027, 1031-32 (E.D.N.C.
1978). Congress conferred exclusive jurisdiction on federal courts to promote policies of
uniform application of its legislation. See id. at 1032. The federal judicial system often fails
to achieve uniformity because the 12 circuit courts may differ in their approaches to similar
questions, and the United States Supreme Court only occasionally will resolve inconsisten-
cies among the circuits by review of their decisions. See Exclusive Jurisdiction of the
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policies underlying res judicata8 In Nash County Board of Education v.
Biltmore Company9 the Fourth Circuit considered whether a state court
action brought under state antitrust laws barred under res judicata a
later federal antitrust suit which only a federal court could hear.'0
In the state action preceding Nash County, the Attorney General of
North Carolina brought suit under North Carolina antitrust laws"
Federal Courts, supra note 6, at 511-12 & 20. Exclusive federal jurisdiction provides
litigants with various procedural and remedial advantages that a state forum might not pro-
vide. See, e.g., Borak v. J.I. Case Co., 317 F.2d 838, 849 (7th Cir. 1963), affd, 377 U.S. 426
(1964) (state statute requiring security for expenses not applicable where federal court had
jurisdiction); Siegfried v. Kansas City Star Co., 298 F.2d 1, 5 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S.
819 (1962) (right to jury trial under civil antitrust claim); 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) (treble damage
recovery for violation of federal antitrust laws); 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976) (provision for nation-
wide service of process under federal securities law); FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37 (broad discovery
rules in federal civil cases). Additionally, a grant of federal jurisdiction allows the federal
bench to gain experience over technical problems or complex concepts inherent in actions
involving specialized or abstruse areas of law. See Einhorn & Gray, The Preclusive Effect
of State Court Determinations in Federal Actions Under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 3 J. CoRP. L. 235, 241-42 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Einhorn & Gray]; Exclusive
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, supra note 6, at 512.
- See Einhorn & Gray, supra note 7, at 241-42. Compare text accompanying notes 1 &
2, supra (res judicata goals include judicial economy and certainty in legal relations) with
text accompanying notes 6-8, supra (exclusive federal jurisdiction objectives include uni-
formity, procedural and remedial advantages, and expertise). See generally Note, The Col-
lateral Estoppel Effect of Prior State Court Findings in Cases Within Exclusive Federal
Jurisdiction, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1281, 1286 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, Exclusive
Federal Jurisdiction]. The first case to confront the competing policies in an antitrust con-
text was Straus v. Am. Publishers' Ass'n, 201 F. 306, 310 (2d Cir. 1912), appeal dismissed,
235 U.S. 716 (1914). In Straus, the Second Circuit determined whether a prior state action
under a state antitrust statute barred under res judicata a later federal antitrust suit. See
id. at 310. The Straus court indicated that although plaintiff brought the first action under a
state statute and the second under a federal statute that granted federal courts exclusive
jurisdiction, the judgment of the first action nonetheless bound the parties. See id.
640 F.2d 484 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1981).
00 See id. at 486.
" See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-1 to 28 (1981). Before the enactment of antitrust legisla-
tion in North Carolina, restraints of trade and unfair trade practices were subject to judicial
scrutiny under the common law. See Culp v. Love, 127 N.C. 457, 461, 37 S.E. 476, 477 (1900
(combination to destroy competition is against public policy). North Carolina first passed an
antitrust statute in 1889. See Ch. 374, [1889] N.C. Sess. L. 372. The North Carolina General
Assembly enacted a new antitrust statute in 1913. See Ch. 41, [1913] N.C. Sess. L. 66.
Within this statute the General Assembly adopted a counter part of § 1 of the Sherman Act.
Compare Ch. 41, § 1, [1913] N.C. Sess. L. 66 with 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). The substantive provi-
sions of the 1913 legislation currently appear in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-1, 75-5(b)(1)-(6) (1981).
The North Carolina Supreme Court has acknowledged that the language of § 75-1 derives
from § 1 of the, Sherman Act. See Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co., 282 N.C. 643, 655, 194
S.E.2d 521, 530 (1973). Chapter 75 applies primarily to such restraints of trade as price fix-
ing, exclusive territorial arrangements, exclusive dealing, refusals to deal, monopolization,
attempts to monopolize, combinations and conspiracies of monopolize, unfair methods of
competition, and unfair trade practices. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-5 (1981). See generally
Aycock, Antitrust and Unfair Trade Practice Law in North Carolina-Federal Law Com-
pared, 50 N.C. L. REV. 199, 200, 206-07 (1972).
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against nine dairy companies. 2 The Attorney General charged the dairy
companies with selling milk products to the state public school systems
at artificially high and noncompetitive prices through agreements in
restraint of trade." The Attorney General claimed to represent each
public school system in the state, 4 and sought both injunctive relief and
treble damages." Before trial, however, the Attorney General and the
nine dairy companies entered into a consent decree that established
" See 640 F.2d at 485-86. The North Carolina Attorney General brought an action in
October, 1974, against nine dairy companies in the case Attorney General v. The Biltmore
Company, et. aL, filed in the General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division of Wake
County. See Joint Brief of Appellees at 2, Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640
F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1981). The Attorney General's suit arose from a two year investigation of
the dairy companies, instigated in response to complaints from various North Carolina
school boards doing business with the dairy companies. See 640 F.2d at 485.
13 See 640 F.2d at 485; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1 (1981). The North Carolina Attorney
General's complaint in Attorney General v. Biltmore Company charged that the defendants
joined in agreements, combinations and conspiracy in restraint of trade in the sale of milk to
North Carolina's public school systems. See 640 F.2d at 485. The complaint further alleged
that the defendants had restrained and eliminated price competition in the sale of fluid milk
and milk products to the public school systems in violation of North Carolina antitrust laws,
leading to unreasonably high, artificial and noncompetitive prices. See id; N.C. GEN. STAT §§
75-1, 75-2 (1981).
" See 640 F.2d at 485. In the state court action prior to Nash County the North
Carolina Attorney General asserted the right to represent each public school system in
North Carolina that received state funds for the purpose of purchasing milk to be resold or
given away to students attending the schools in each public school system. Id. The North
Carolina Attorney General has authority to represent all North Carolina state departments,
bureaus, agencies, institutions, commissions or other organized activities of the state that
receive support from the state. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-2 (1978). This broad grant of
authority is supplemented in the antitrust context by the North Carolina antitrust statutes,
which empower the Attorney General to bring suit to enforce the statutes. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 75-14, to 16 (1981); 640 F.2d at 494-95. The Attorney General sought to have certi-
fied, pursuant to Rule 23(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, a class consisting
of all public school systems in North Carolina that had used state tax money to purchase
milk from any of the nine defendants in the state action brought by the Attorney General.
See id. at 486, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1 Rule 24 (1969). The purported class, however, was
never certified. See id. at 486.
" See 640 F.2d at 485. Section 75-14 of the North Carolina General Statutes authorizes
the Attorney General of North Carolina to sue on behalf of the state to obtain permanent or
temporary injunctions. N.C. GEN. STAT § 75-14 (1981). Section 75-16 allows recovery of tre-
ble damages in the event of violation of the state antitrust laws. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16
(1981).
1 " See 640 F.2d at 486. A consent decree is a negotiated agreement between a defen-
dant and plaintiff whereby the defendant agrees to cease alleged illegal activities and the
plaintiff drops the action against the defendant. See Timberg, A Primer on Antitrust Con-
sent Judgments and FTC Consent Orders, 39 BROOKLYN L. REV. 567, 567-68 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Timberg]; "To Bind or Not to Bind," supra note 2, at 1324-25 (1974). A
consent decree constitutes a judicial determination even though based upon an agreement
between the parties. See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114-15 (1932); United
States v. Radio Corp. of Am., 46 F. Supp. 654, 655 (D. Del. 1942) appeal dismissed, 318 U.S.
796 (1943); Timberg, supra at 568; note 44 infra. The United States Attorney General relies
on consent decrees to enforce federal antitrust laws. See United States v. ASCAP, 331 F.2d
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procedures for negotiating milk contract prices with the North Carolina
public school systems." The consent decree did not provide monetary
damages for the state or the school systems.8
Following resolution of the state action, the Nash County Board of
Education (Board) instituted an action in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina19 against the same nine
dairy companies that were defendants in the prior state action, alleging
violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman Act).2 The dairy com-
panies moved for summary judgment, arguing that the consent decree in
the North Carolina state court action barred the federal suit under the
doctrine of res judicata.21 The district court granted the motion in a
memorandum opinion, and the Board appealed to the Fourth Circuit.'
On appeal, the Board made arguments regarding all three elements
required in the application of res judicata." The judgment in the prior
action must constitute a final judgment on the merits, both actions must
117, 123-24 (2d Cir. 1964). Consent decrees resolve 80-85% of the civil antitrust cases
brought by the Justice Department's Antitrust Division. See Thnberg, supra, at 567. See
generally Note, The Consent Judgment as an Instrument of Compromise and Settlement,
72 HARv. L. REV. 1314, 1320-21 (1959).
17 See 464 F. Supp. at 1028-29. The consent decree between the North Carolina Attor-
ney General and the dairy companies provided mandatory procedures for reporting to the
Attorney General's office all bids and negotiated prices for milk contracts with North
Carolina public school systems. See id. The consent decree stated that all matters in con-
troversy arising from the action were settled to the satisfaction of both the Attorney
General and the defendant dairy companies. See id. at 1028.
1 See id. at 1029.
19 See id. The Nash County Board of Education (Board) brought suit against nine dairy
companies in reliance upon a letter from the North Carolina Attorney General to all school
superintendants stating that the consent decree did not preclude individual school systems
from instituting actions to recover money damages arising out of the antitrust activity of
the dairy companies. See id. The Board brought suit as a class-action on behalf of itself and
all other county and city boards of education in North Carolina. See id. at 1028; N.C. GEN
STAT. § 1A-1 Rule 23(a) (1969).
See 640 F.2d at 486. In Nash County the Nash County Board of Education alleged
that nine dairy companies combined and conspired to fix prices and monopolize the public
school market for milk and milk products in North Carolina in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act. See 464 F. Supp. at 1028; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976). The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7 (1976), makes illegal the.restraint of trade or commerce. See id. § 1(a). The United
States Supreme Court has acknowledged the substantial federal interest in enforcing a na-
tional policy in favor of competition, and has called the Sherman Act the "Magna Carta of
free enterprise." See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445
U.S. 97, 110-11 (1980), quoting United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610
(1972); Note, California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.: Federal
Power Under the Twenty-First Amendment?, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 302, 308 n.30 (1981).
See generally W. LETwiN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA 54-70 (1965); H. THORELLI,
THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY (1954); Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust- Other Than Com-
petition and Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1191, 1203 (1977).
,1 See 464 F. Supp. at 1028.
, See 640 F.2d at 486.
" See id. at 486-87, 493.
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involve the same cause of action, and there must be an identity of parties
or those in privity with the parties in the two suits.24 The Board asserted
that none of the elements of res judicata were present in their federal
action.' The Board argued that the consent decree in the first action did
not constitute a final judgment because the Board never agreed to the
decree.2" Further, the Board maintained that it was neither a party to
the state action nor in privity with the North Carolina Attorney General
as plaintiff in the state action." Finally, the Board contended that the
North Carolina action under state antitrust law constituted a different
cause of action from the federal action based on the Sherman Act.' The
Board relied on the Second Circuit decision in Lyons v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp.29 to argue that a state court judgment may not bar a
, See id.
See Brief for Appellant at 10-11, Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d
484 (4th Cir. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant].
I See 640 F.2d at 486-87; Brief for Appellant, supra note 25, at 33-35; Reply Brief for
Appellant at 25-26, Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as Reply Brief]. In Nash County, the Board argued that even if the Board
was in privity with the North Carolina Attorney General, the consent judgment under
North Carolina law did not bind the Board because the Attorney General entered into the
agreement without the Board's consent. See 640 F.2d at 496; Town of Bath v. Norman, 226
N.C. 502, 505, 39 S.E.2d 363, 364-65 (1946) (consent judgment void without consent); Brief for
Appellant, supra note 25, at 33-35.
1 See 640 F.2d at 493-96; Brief for Appellant, supra note 25, at 11-15; Reply Brief,
supra note 26, at 21-24.
2 See 640 F.2d at 487-90; Brief for Appellant, supra note 25, at 30-41; Reply Brief,
supra note 26, at 12-21. The Board in Nash County argued that although the North Carolina
and federal antitrust statutes are similar, courts have applied the statutes differently. See
Brief for Appellant, supra note 25, at 38. As an example of disparate treatment of similar
statutes, the Board asserted that North Carolina law offers no remedy to plaintiffs injured
by concerted refusals to do business, while the Sherman Act offers plaintiffs remedies for
such injuries. Compare McNeill v. Hall, 220 N.C. 73, 74-75, 16 S.E.2d 456, 457 (1941) (no
remedy under North Carolina law for plaintiff injured by concerted refusal to deal) with
Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38, 46 (1904) (concerted refusal to deal violates § 1 of
Sherman Act). See Brief for Appellant, supra note 25, at 38.
29 222 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.), reh. denied, 222 F.2d 195, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955). In
addition to Lyons, the Board in Nash County cited Cream Top Creamery v. Dean Milk Com-
pany, 383 F.2d 358 (6th Cir. 1967) and Englehardt v. Bell & Howell Co., 327 F.2d 30 (8th Cir.
1964) to support its argument that state interpretation of state law should not preempt a
federal antitrust action under res judicata. See 640 F.2d at 489-90; Brief for Appellant,
supra note 25, at 39-40. In Cream Top Creamery, the Sixth Circuit denied the preclusive ef-
fect of a state court action brought under state law. See 383 F.2d at 363. The Fourth Circuit
in Nash County distinguished Cream Top Creamery by noting that res Judicata should not
apply when the relief afforded in the federal and state forums differs. See 640 F.2d at 490;
note 60 supra. In Englehardt, a federal court dismissed under res judicata an action
previously brought under state antitrust laws and subsequently removed to federal court
under diversity jurisdiction. See 327 F.2d at 31. The Fifth Circuit dismissed Englehardt
because the plaintiffs prior state action was removed to federal court for diversity and then
dismissed with prejudice. See id. The Nash County court reasoned that Englehardt was an
action on a state statute, and since the dismissal acted to preempt the later federal action
under res judicata, Englehardt actually supported the application of res judicata in Nash
County. See 640 F.2d at 489; 327 F.2d at 31.
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subsequent federal court action brought under federal antitrust laws."
In Lyons, the Second Circuit considered whether a judgment on ap-
peal in a state court action should stay a later federal action between the
same parties brought under federal antitrust statutes." As defendant in
the state action involving a consignment contract account, Lyons built
his defense against Westinghouse on antitrust grounds.2 The state court
found no merit in Lyons' antitrust defense, and awarded judgment for
Westinghouse.' Lyons then brought an antitrust suit in federal court
against Westinghouse while appealing the state judgment.
3 Westing-
house filed a motion to stay the federal suit until final resolution of the
antitrust question in the state court.3 5 The district court granted
Westinghouse's motion to stay," but the Second Circuit ordered the
district court to vacate the stay. The Lyons court indicated that the
grant to federal courts of exclusive jurisdiction over antitrust actions in-
fers an immunity of their decisions from prejudgment.
8 The court
I See 640 F.2d at 490; 222 F.2d at 188-89. The Second Circuit in Lyons did not clarify
whether a grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction itself creates in a federal suit a separate
and distinct cause of action from a similar state court action between the same parties. See
222 F.2d at 188-89. The Eighth Circuit interpreted Lyons as implying that the state and
federal causes of action were the same, but nonetheless denied state court preemption of
the federal action under res judicata for policy reasons. See Englehardt v. Bell & Howell
Co., 327 F.2d 30, 34-35 (8th Cir. 1964). Englehardt thus framed the issue in Lyons as whether
an exception should be made to the general finality rule of prior adjudications, and not
whether the causes of action are the same. See id. at 35; Nash County Bd. of Educ. v.
Biltmore Co., 464 F. Supp. at 1031 (agreeing with Eighth Circuit identification of proper. in-
quiry as whether circumstances warrant exception).




See Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 16 F.R.D. 384, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
See id.
' See 222 F.2d at 190. Lyons involved collateral estoppel rather than res Judicata. See
640 F.2d at 490. Collateral estoppel extends only to facts and issues decided and necessary
to the original decision, while res judicata extends not only to all matters pleaded, but to all
matters that might have been pleaded. See, e.g., Industrial Credit Co. v. Berg, 388 F.2d 835,
841 (8th Cir. 1968) (collateral estoppel bars litigation in second suit of basic issues adjudi-
cated in first suit); Cream Top Creamery v. Dean Milk Co., 383 F.2d 358, 362 (6th Cir. 1967)
(collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of issues determined in prior suit); Republic Gear
Co. v. Borg-Warner Co., 381 F.2d 551, 555 n.1 (2d Cir. 1967) (collateral estoppel bars relitiga-
tion of issue even against different defendants). See generally 1B MOORE, supra note 1,
0.441[1] at 3771-74. The distinction between collateral estoppel and res judicata is unimpor-
tant to the analysis in Nash County because a collateral estoppel plea that embraces all the
constituent elements of a federal claim has the same effect as res judicata to bar a federal
action. See 640 F.2d at 488; text accompanying note 57 infra.
I See 222 F.2d.at 189. One commentator considering Lyons has noted that neither
legislative history nor judicial pronouncement indicates whether Congress' grant of an ex-
clusive remedy under the antitrust laws rests upon a policy so strong as to immunize the
federal courts from the effect of state court judgments. See Comment, Exclusive Federal
Jurisdiction.. The Effect of State Court Findings, 8 STAN. L. REV. 439, 447 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Effect of State Court Findings].
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reasoned that federal antitrust statutes, which are national in scope, re-
quire uniform administration, and that federal courts would best accom-
plish uniform administration through untramelled jurisdiction. 9 The Se-
cond Circuit also noted that the remedy in the state court was different
from the treble damages available in the federal court, and concluded
that the state court judgment should not preclude the treble damage
recovery." In holding that the state court decision does not bar the
federal action the Second Circuit thus prevented the preclusion of exclu-
sive federal jurisdiction by a state court ruling.1
The Fourth Circuit rejected each of the Board's arguments.2 The
Nash County court held that the consent decree constituted, for res
judicata purposes, a final judgment on the merits. 3 The court recognized
that fraud, lack of jurisdiction, or lack of actual consent by the parties
may invalidate consent decrees.4 The Fourth Circuit determined,
"' See 222 F.2d at 189. In Lyons the Second Circuit could have supported its holding
with additional factors that underlie grants of exclusive federal jurisdiction, such as the
federal bench's experience in hearing antitrust litigation and the availability of extensive
discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Note, Res Judicata- Exclusive
Federal Jurisdiction and the Effect of Prior State-Court Determinations, 53 VA. L. REv.
1360, 1365 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Note, State-Court Determinations]; text accompany-
ing notes 7-8 supra.
40 222 F.2d at 189. The Lyons court concluded that since two-thirds of the damages
recovered in a federal antitrust actions are punitive, a state judgment should not foreclose
such recovery. See id. The Lyons court considered the availability of treble damage
recovery under the federal antitrust statute to be basic to the private enforcement of federal
antitrust laws. See id. Preclusion of the treble damage recovery by state court would inhibit
such private enforcement actions, thus undermining the effort to prevent monopoly and
restraint of commerce. See id; 640 F.2d at 491; Note, State-Court Determinations, supra
note 39, at 1365.
" See 222 F.2d at 484. Judge Hand's reasoning in Lyons appears in a subsequent case
under the Economic Stabilization Act, P.L. 91-379 (Aug. 15, 1970); 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1976) in
which the court faced the question of the preclusive effect of a prior state adjudication. See
United States v. Ohio, 487 F.2d 936, 943 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
1014 (1975). In denying the preclusive effect the court stated that the Act manifested a clear
intent to give federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over litigation arising from the Act. Id.
The court reasoned that the national scope of the Act and the doctrine of federal preemp-
tion should negate giving any res judicata effect to the state court judgment. See id.; note
58 infra.
42 See 640 F.2d at 487, 493, 496-97.
See id. at 487.
', See id. Under res judicata, consent decrees bar any attempt to relitigate the issues
raised in the first suit. See United States v. Radio Corp. of Am., 46 F. Supp. 654, 656 (D.
Del.), appeal dismissed, 318 U.S. 796 (1942). Exceptions to this rule exist when a defendant
engaged in illegal conduct after entering into the consent agreement, when the consent
decree has become obsolete as a result of changed circumstances or legal standards, or
when a different plaintiff or statute is involved. See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of Am. v. United
States, 302 U.S. 230, 232 (1937) (decree not a bar to suit involving substantially different
subject matter and parties); United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp.
295, 345 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (per curiam) (change in legal standards);
Timberg, supra note 16, at 576-77 (exceptions to general rule that consent judgments bar
relitigation). See also Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 324 (1928) (consent decree
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however, that these factors were not at issue in the Nash County
appeal. 5 The Nash County court also found that the Board was in privity
with the Attorney General in the state action.46 The court acknowledged
that the Board had authority under state law to sue on its own behalf.41
The court reasoned, however, that the Board's authority did not conflict
with the Attorney General's right to represent the state's school
districts.48 Moreover, the Fourth Circuit found that the Attorney
General's failure to consult with the Board before entering into the con-
sent decree did not adversely affect the legality of the consent decree,
because the Attorney General, as legal representative of the sovereign,
had power to bind the state and its subdivisions by his acts.49
voidable when entered without actual consent or when fraud in procurement); Sagers v.
Yellow Freight Systems, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 686, 690 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (consent decree voided in
class action because entered into without adequate notice of terms and conditions to class
members).
640 F.2d at 486-87. Although the Fourth Circuit determined that lack of actual con-
sent was not at issue in the Nash County appeal, the Board did contend that it never con-
sented to be bound by the consent decree, which the North Carolina Attorney General
negotiated. See id.; Brief for Appellant, supra note 25, at 33-35; note 26 supra. The Fourth
Circuit neutralized the Board's argument by finding that the Attorney General had the
authority as the Board's representative to bind the Board to the consent decree. See 640
F.2d at 495; note 14 supra. Nevertheless the Fourth Circuit's characterization of the consent
issue as uncontested is inaccurate. See 640 F.2d at 487; text accompanying note 27 supra.
11 640 F.2d at 494. Although no single accepted definition of privity exists, one defini-
tion refers to privity as a "nutual or successive relationship to the same right of property."
See California v. United States, 235 F.2d 647, 663 n.16 (9th Cir. 1956) quoting Litchfield v.
Goodnow, 123 U.S. 549, 551 (1887); International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Gen. Tel. & R. Corp.,
380 F. Supp. 976, 983 & n.7 (M.D.N.C. 1974), vacated 527 F.2d 1162 (4th Cir. 1975); Hawkeye
Life Ins. Co. v. Valley Des Moines Co. 220 Iowa 556, 561-62, 260 N.W. 669, 673 (1935). One
commentator has noted that with regard to res judicata the term "privity" does not state a
reason for either including or excluding a person from the binding effect of a prior judg-
ment. Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Parties, 50 I0wA L. REV. 27, 45 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Vestal]. Rather, privity represents a legal conclusion that the relation-
ship between the one who is a party on the record and the non-party is sufficiently close to
apply the principles of preclusion. See id, see also Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d
419, 423 (3d Cir.) (Goodrich, J., concurring), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950) (privity denotes
relationship between party on record and another who is close enough to be included within
res judicata).
" See 640 F.2d at 495; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-27 (1978). North Carolina General Statute
§ 115-27 states that the board of education of each county in the state has authority to pro-
secute and defend its own suits. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-27 (1978). Under General Statute
§ 115-31(a) each school board may bring suit to recover debts. See id. § 115-31(a); Locklear v.
N.C. State Bd. of Elections, 514 F.2d 1152, 1153 (4th Cir. 1975) (each North Carolina school
board an independent corporate body).
0 See 640 F.2d at 496. Of the common law and due process requirements of res
judicata, the Fourth Circuit in Nash County appeared to have the greatest difficulty deter-
mining the requirement of an identity of parties. See id. The Nash County court surveyed
the common law and statutory authority of the state Attorney General in finding that the
Attorney General had authority to represent the Board. See id. at 494. The Fourth Circuit
found no North Carolina statutory or constitutional provision limiting the authority of the
Attorney General to represent departments, agencies or other organized activities receiv-
ing support from the North Carolina state government. See id.
" See 640 F.2d at 496; note 14 supra.
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Finally, the Fourth Circuit found the causes of action of the state
suit and the federal suit virtually identical." The Nash County court
acknowledged that both suits involved the same purchases of dairy prod-
ucts from the same nine dairy companies and alleged the same wrongful
act of an illegal price-fixing conspiracy.-" The court noted that the state
and the federal statutes contain identical language, 2 with the exception
that the federal statute requires a showing that the alleged antitrust ac-
tivity involve interstate commerce. 3 The Fourth Circuit recognized that
the difference between statutes which provide the basis of two suits will
not necessarily destroy the identity of the actions in a res judicata con-
text.'
The Fourth Circuit found unpersuasive the Lyons argument that ex-
clusive federal jurisdiction implies an immunity from prejudgment.' The
Fourth Circuit noted that the Lyons court conceded that single facts
determined in the state action, if not decisive of the whole federal anti-
trust violation, could preclude relitigation in federal court of the facts
already determined." The Lyons court reasoned, however, that single
facts determined by the state court which encompassed the whole nexus
of facts comprising the antitrust violation could not be allowed, by
federal court recognition of their determination, to defeat the exclusiv-
ity of the federal antitrust law jurisdiction.57 Considering judicial deci-
sions after Lyons which have largely ignored the importance the Lyons
court attached to unfettered federal jurisdiction, the Fourth Circuit
found untenable the distinction between single fact determination and
whole issue determination. 8
o 640 F.2d at 488.
51 See id.
See id.; compare 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) (every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
states, or with foreign nations declared illegal) with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1 (1981) (every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce in the state of North Carolina declared illegal).
1 See 640 F.2d at 488; 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). See also Crane v. Intermountain Health
Care, Inc., [1980-1] Trade Cas. 77,593, 77,596 (10th Cir. 1980), rehearing en bane granted, No.
78-1346 (10th Cir. Sept. 16, 1980) (complaint dismissed for failure to disclose defendants'
restraint of trade and substantial effect on interstate commerce); Note, Interstate Com-
merce and the Sherman Act 58 DEN. L.J. 273, 273 (1981).
" See 640 F.2d at 488; Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., 186 F.2d 464, 469
(3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 41 U.S. 921 (1951) (same cause of action between same parties in
two suits though brought under different federal antitrust laws).
See 640 F.2d at 492.
See id. at 491; 222 F.2d at 188-89; note 37 supra.
6 See 222 F.2d at 188. The Fourth Circuit in Nash County admitted that when a plea
of collateral estoppel based on a prior state action between the parties embraces all the con-
stituent elements of the federal antitrust claim, the acceptance of the plea acts with the
same effect of res judicata to defeat exclusive federal jurisdiction. See 640 F.2d at 491; Com-
ment, Effect of State Court Findings, supra note 38, at 444-46; Note, State-Court Deter-
minations, supra note 39, at 1368-69.
1 See 640 F.2d at 491-92. Cases are rare which hold that special grants of jurisdiction
cannot be limited by adjudication made by some other court. See United States v. Ohio, 487
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In noting that the remedies available in the federal action did not dif-
fer from those available in the state action, the Fourth Circuit found the
second ground of the Lyons reasoning inapplicable.59 In Lyons treble
damages were not available in the state action, yet the damages recover-
able under the North Carolina antitrust statute and the Sherman Act
are identical." The Fourth Circuit further distinguished Lyons because
the plaintiff in Nash County could choose his forum which the Lyons
plaintiff, as defendant in the state action, could not. 1
Faced with the apparently competing goals of res Judicata and exclu-
sive federal jurisdiction, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Nash County is
sound. Prejudgment in a state court that precludes under res Judicata a
federal court's exclusive jurisdiction potentially subverts the goals
underlying grants of federal jurisdiction.2 Under the facts of Nash Coun-
ty, however, the rationales supporting res judicata and exclusive federal
jurisdiction did not conflict. The Fourth Circuit's examination of the
federal and state antitrust statutes shows that different sovereigns
created a common remedy for the same wrong. 4 The state and federal
antitrust statutes require the same evidence for proof of violation, and
the penalties under each statute are equally severe. 5 The Fourth Circuit
F.2d 936, 943 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1973); note 41 supra. Most courts, however, have ig-
nored the exclusive federal jurisdiction arguments of Lyons. See Granader v. Public Bank,
417 F.2d 75, 81 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1065 (1970) (antitrust conspiracy);
Nelson v. Swing-A-Way'Mfg. Co., 266 F.2d 184, 186-87 (8th Cir. 1959) (patent infringement);
Vanderveer v. Erie Malleable Iron Co., 238 F.2d 510, 512-13 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353
U.S. 937 (1957) (patent infringement); Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49, 56 (N.D. Ohio
1959) (alternative holding), affd, 279 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960) (Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1976) violation). See generally Currie, supra note 2, at 347 n.203 (1978);
Note, Stale-Court Determination, supra note 39, at 1365 n.24.
' See 640 F.2d at 492.
See id. Both 15 U.S.C. § 15 and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 provide treble damages in
the event of antitrust violations. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (1981);
note.15 supra.
"1 See 640 F.2d at 492. See also Note, State-Court Determinations, supra note 39, at
1383 (plaintiffs' choice of forum waives immunity from preclusion in second action).
11 See Note, Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 8, at 1288-89. Some commen-
tators urge that rules foreclosing relitigation of actions in federal courts after state court
judgments should not apply to civil rights actions. See Averitt, Federal Section 1983 Ac-
tions After State Court Judgment, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 191, 201-02 (1972) (vindication of
paramount federal rights under supremacy clause); McCormack, Federalism and Section
1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Claims (Part 11, 60 VA. L. REV.
250, 276-77 (1974) (vindication of individual freedom from unlawful intrusion balanced
against res judicata); Theis, Res Judicata in Civil Rights Act Cases: An Introduction to the
Problem, 70 NEV. U. L. REv. 859, 868 (1976) (legislative history of Title 42 United States
Code § 1985 shows congressional distrust of state courts); Note, Developments in the
Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90-HARv. L. REv. 1133, 1333 (1977) (foreclosing subse-
quent litigation in federal courts undermines basic premise of forum choice).
See text accompanying notes 1-2, 6-8 supra.
See 640 F.2d at 488; Note, State-Court Determinations, supra note 39, at 1375.
See 640 F.2d at 488; text accompanying notes 52 & 53 supra.
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correctly held that the state and federal causes of action do not foster
distinct interests." In affirming the district court, the Fourth Circuit
may seem harsh in denying the Board the opportunity to sue for treble
damages. 7 Nonetheless, to hold otherwise would offer the federal plain-
tiff the chance to harass the defendants.
6 8
The Fourth Circuit's application of res judicata in Nash County does
not necessarily establish a precedent neutralizing all claims of exclusive
federal jurisdiction following state court judgments. The traditional
limitations on res judicata gradually have loosened to the extent that
courts need neither absolutely apply nor rigidly reject the doctrine."9 In
determining that a prior adjudication binds certain parties, courts con-
sider the underlying facts of each case, and not solely the relative
posture of the parties." Moreover, federal courts may adjudicate an ac-
tion following a state judgment when the action concerns questions of
overriding federal policy.7 In Nash County the Fourth Circuit correctly
" See 640 F.2d at 495; Note, State-Court Determination, supra note 39, at 1375.
" See 464 F. Supp. at 1037. The district court in Nash County acknowledged that the
result of precluding the Board's federal suit might appear harsh. See id. The district court
stated that if the Board was dissatisfied with the resolution of the state action brought by
the Attorney General such dissatisfaction was the price the Board paid for being a creation
of the state. See id. The district court's statement implies a subtitle criticism of the At-
torney General for not fulfilling his responsibilities as representative of the state when he
entered into the consent decree without seeking monetary damages. See id. at 1028-29,
1037. Although the Attorney General may merit such criticism, under the North Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure the Board could have intervened in the state action to become a
party proper. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § lA-1 Rule 24 (1969) (intervention of right where appli-
cant claims interest and not adequately represented by existing parties). Ordinarily North
Carolina state courts have such discretion to permit proper parties to intervene. See
Strickland v. Hughes, 273 N.C. 481, 484, 160 S.E.2d 313, 316 (1968). Through its own inac-
tion, the Board shares the responsibility for the harsh result in Nash County.
Cf. White v. Adler, 289 N.Y. 34, 42-43, 43 N.E.2d 798, 801-02 (1942) (res judicata
designed to prevent harassment of defendant).
69 See Shewmaker v. Minchew, 504 F. Supp. 156, 161 (D.D.C. 1980). See e.g., Mitchell v.
National Broadcasting Co., 553 F.2d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 1977) (res Judicata a flexible doctrine);
Tipler v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 443 F.2d 125, 128 (6th Cir. 1971) (res judicata is
not rigidly applied); Holland, Modernizing Res Judicata: Reflections on the Parklane Doc-
trine, 55 INDIANA L.J. 615, 631 (1980) (case-by-case discretion in use of preclusion techniques
by federal courts); Vestal, supra note 46 at 75 (weighing process involving savings of court's
time and adequacy of protection extended).
70 See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327-28 (1979) (court must view
relative posture of litigants in first action); Gerrard v. Larsen, 517 F.2d 1127, 1132 (8th Cir.
1975) (court guided by most just and reasoned precedent); American Mannex Corp. v.
Rozands, 462 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir. 1972) (federal court not bound by state interpretation of
res judicata); Alderman v. Chrysler Corp., 480 F. Supp. 600, 607 (E.D. Va. 1975) (due process
violation to bind a litigant who was neither a party nor a privity to earlier suit). See
generally 1B MOORE, supra note 1, 0.412[1].
71 See Chapman v. Aetna Finance Co., 615 F.2d 361, 364 (5th Cir. 1980) (full faith and
credit clause does not compel dismissal of suit); Red Fox v. Red Fox, 564 F.2d 361, 364-65
(9th Cir. 1977) (state court judgment not invariably a basis of res judicata in federal suit);
Williams v. Sclafani, 444 F. Supp. 895, 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (well defined federal policies may
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discerned that the state suit adequately addressed potential overriding
federal policy considerations as well as all other compelling reasons
which might have justified rejecting the application of res judicata to
the Board's federal suit.
MATTHEW L. KIMBALL
D. Rule 60(b)(6)
Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure' permits a
district court to relieve a litigant from a final judgment or order upon
the litigant's motion made within a reasonable time2 and for "any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."' A trial
court's consideration of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion involves balancing the
compete with res judicata); Cullen v. New York State Civil Service Comm'n, 435 F. Supp.
546, 555-56 & n.5 (E.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 566 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1977) (policies of civil
rights statutes outweighed policies of full faith and credit clause); McNally v. Esmark, 427
F. Supp. 1211, 1219 (N.D. IlM. 1977) (federal court not bound by state interpretation of when
judgment is final); L.J. Taylor v. New York City Transit Authority, 309 F. Supp. 785, 791
(E.D.N.Y.), affd, 433 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1970) (if state provides means to assert constitutional
rights, federal courts should grant full faith and credit). See generally 1B MOORE, supra note
1, 0.405[1] at 783; Einhorn & Gray, supra note 7, at 239.
I FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) provides in part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the courts may relieve a party
or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2)
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered
in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an
adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, releas-
ed, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have pro-
spective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of
the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons
(1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding
was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.
I See id.
3 See id. Rule 60(b) must be read in conjunction with Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure and Rule 774d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Buckeye
Cellulose Corp. v. Braggs Elec. Constr. Co., 569 F.2d 1036, 1038 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
Rule 4(a) provides that a litigant must file a notice of appeal within thirty days of the entry
of a final judgment or order. FED. R. App. P. 4(a). Upon a showing of excusable neglect, the
district court can extend the time for filing for an additional period not exceeding thirty
days. Id. Rule 77(d) requires the clerk of the district court to serve on the parties notice by
mail of the entry of the final judgment or order. FED. R. Civ. P. 77(d). Lack of notice does
not, however, affect a litigant's time in which to appeal, except as permitted in Rule 4(a).
See id.
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need for finality in litigation against the desire to effect a just result be-
tween the parties.4 In Klapprott v. United States,' the Supreme Court
stated that courts should apply Rule 60(b)(6) whenever such action is ap-
propriate to accomplish justice.' One year later, however, in Ackermann
v. United States,7 the Court distinguished Klapprott as an exception to
the general principle of the finality of judgments.' The Ackermann Court
declared that courts should grant Rule 60(b)(6) relief only under extra-
ordinary circumstances.'
Klapprott, Ackermann, and their progeny," while delineating the
broad parameters within which courts are to exercise their discretion,
have provided scant guidance concerning what constitutes extraordi-
nary circumstances. 1 Further, the Advisory Committee on Rules has not
' See Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 401 (5th Cir. 1981); Compton v.
Alton Steamship Co., 608 F.2d 96, 102 (4th Cir. 1979); Boughner v. Secretary of HEW, 572
F.2d 976, 977 (3d Cir. 1978); N.Y. State Health Facilities Ass'n v. Carey, 76 F.R.D. 128,
132-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). In Seven Elves, the Fifth Circuit stated the general rule that Rule
60(b) balances the court's desire to preserve the finality of judgment against "the incessant
command of the court's conscience that justice be done in light of all the facts." 635 F.2d at
401 (quoting Bankers Mortgage Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73, 77 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
399 U.S. 927 (1970)) (emphasis in 635 F.2d 396). See generally Kane, Relief from Federal
Judgments: A Morass Unrelieved by a Rule, 30 HAST. L. J. 41, 68-70 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Kane]; Comment, Rule 601b): Survey and Proposal for General Reform, 60 CALIF. L.
REV. 531, 533 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Proposal for General Reform]; Note, Federal Rule
601b), 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 469 n.3 (1981).
335 U.S. 601 (1949).
Id. at 614-15. Klapprott involved a Rule 60(b) petition to reopen a default judgment
of denaturalization. Id. at 602-03. Klapprott was in prison on an unrelated charge at the time
he suffered his default judgment. Id. Despite due diligence, he failed to answer the com-
plaint or appear in court. Id. at 604-08. The Klapprott court held that the "extraordinary"
circumstances of the case warranted relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Id. at 613.
7 340 U.S. 193 (1950).
Id. at 202.
Id. Ackermann involved a petition to reopen a default judgment of denaturalization.
Id. at 194. The petitioner in Ackermann claimed that he had not appealed his default judg-
ment because of financial inability to do so. Id. at 195-96. The Court denied Rule 60(b) relief,
finding that Ackermann's actions demonstrated a conscious choice not to appeal, rather
than an extraordinary excuse for not appealing. Id. at 197-98.
" See Polites v. United States, 364 U.S. 426 (1960).
" See 7 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.27[1],[2] (1979) [hereinafter cited as MOORE]; 11
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2864 (1973); Kane, supra note
4, at 42. According to Klapprott and Ackermann, extraordinary circumstances exist only
when the Rule 60(b) movant does not have the opportunity to choose between appealing and
not appealing a judgment. See 340 U.S. at 197-98; Kane, supra note 4, at 53. At first glance,
the standard appears clear. The extraordinary circumstances test thus seems to compel
trial courts to focus on whether the movant made a fair and deliberate choice not to move
for relief at an earlier time. If so, the trial court should not relieve the movant of that
choice. See Horace v. St. Louis Sw. R.R., 489 F.2d 632, 633 (8th Cir. 1974); Lubben v. Selec-
tive Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 27, 453 F.2d 645, 651-52 (1st Cir. 1972); Rinieri v. News Syn-
dicate Co., 385 F.2d 818, 822-23 (2d Cir. 1967). The free and deliberate choice inquiry,
however, has had minimal impact in practice. See Kane, supra note 4, at 57. Only in
denaturalization cases have courts been able to discern readily when extraordinary cir-
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proposed an amendment to Rule 60(b)(6) to clarify the "any other reason"
language of the rule.1 2 As a result, courts frequently find it difficult to
determine the existence of extraordinary circumstances in particular
cases.13 The confused state of the law has prompted increased litigation
and therefore has undermined the policy of finality sought to be fur-
thered by the extraordinary circumstances limitation. 4 In Hensley v.
Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Co., 5 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
considered whether Rule 60(b)(6) relief was appropriate to extend the
time for appeal when a litigant failed to receive notice of the entry of a
final order. In a decision favoring the policy of finality, the Fourth Cir-
cuit denied Rule 60(b)(6) relief because the movant had not demonstrated
extraordinary circumstances. 8
Hensley brought an action against his employer, The Chesapeake
and Ohio Railway Company (C&O), under the provisions of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act. 7 Alleging negligence by C&O, 8 Hensley
sought monetary damages for personal injuries sustained during the
course of his employment. A jury awarded the plaintiff $40,000 on his
claim and the district court entered judgment on the verdict. 9 Appar-
ently dissatisfied with the amount of the verdidt, Hensley moved for a
new trial.0
cumstances are present. Id. Courts have looked to whether the defendant defaulted,
whether the defendant was incarcerated and unable to obtain counsel, and whether the
defendant was in a condition to make decisions concerning his defense. See e.g., Zurini v.
United States, 189 F.2d 722, 726 (8th Cir. 1951); United States v. Backofen, 176 F.2d 263, 268
(3d Cir. 1949); United States v. Fallla, 164 F. Supp. 307,314 (D.N.J. 1958). The usefulness of the
free and deliberate choice inquiry breaks down in other settings when the parties are
represented by counsel. See Kane, supra note 4, at 58. When the party's attorney either
makes or negligently fails to make the decision to appeal, courts generally deny relief, find-
ing that the decision was free and deliberate. Id. Moreover, courts deny relief by invoking
the general rule that the court is to impute the lawyer's negligence to his client. Id. The free
and deliberate choice inquiry most often serves, therefore, as merely another talisman for
denying relief. Id.
12 See Proposal for General Reform, supra note 4, at 531 n.2; Report of Proposed
Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts 61-63 (1955)
[hereinafter cited as Proposed Amendments]. The Advisory Committee on Rules has not
proposed amendments to Rule 60(b) since 1955. See Proposal for General Reform, supra
note 4, at 531 n.2; Proposed Amendments, supra. The last amendment adopted dates from
1948. See Proposal for General Reform, supra note 4, at 531 n.3; Report of Proposed
Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States 78-84
(1946).
1' See text accompanying note 71 infra.
1, See Kane, supra note 4, at 85-86.
15 651 F.2d 226 (1981).
11 Id. at 231.
I 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1976).
18 651 F.2d at 227.
9 Id.
Id. In Hensley, the plaintiff requested that the district court grant a new trial on the
issue of damages alone, or alternatively on all of the issues raised in the trial.
See Appendix to Brief for Appellant at 7, 651 F.2d 227 (1981).
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The district court denied the plaintiffs motion and the clerk of the
court complied with the court's direction to mail certified copies of its
order of denial to all counsel of record.2' Counsel for C&O received notice
of the order.' Counsel for Hensley, however, claimed not to have receiv-
ed notice of the order at that time.'
Six months after Hensley filed his motion for a new trial, Hensley's
counsel directed a letter to the district court, inquiring into the court's
decision on the motion.u The clerk of the court informed the attorney
that the court had entered its order of denial approximately three and
one-half months prior to the inquiry." Hensley's counsel subsequently
received a copy of the order.28 Shortly thereafter, Hensley made a Rule
60(b)(6) motion to the district court to reconsider the order or, alter-
natively, to vacate the order and reenter it as of a later date to allow him
an opportunity to bring a timely appeal.'
The district court granted Hensley's motion to vacate and also
reentered the denial order as of a later date.' Hensley immediately filed
an appeal challenging the substance of the reentered order of denial.'
C&O cross-appealed, challenging the district court's order granting the
plaintiff's Rule 60(b)(6) motion."
The district court based its disposition of Hensley's motion on three
grounds. First, relying on the decision of the Fourth Circuit in United
States v. Cato Brothers,"1 the court ruled that relief was appropriate
21 651 F.2d at 227. The docket sheet of the district court in Hensley reflects that the
clerk complied with the directive of the court. Id.
22 Id.
' Id. In Hensley, local and out-of-state counsel of record represented Hensley. See Ap-
pendix to Brief for Appellant at 19-24, 651 F.2d 227 (1981). Both counsel submitted affidavits
stating that neither they nor anyone in their offices had received notice of the order deny-
ing Hensley's motion for a new trial. Id.
24 651 F.2d at 227-28. In Hensley, Hensley's counsel made the motion for a new trial on
March 23, 1979. Id. Out-of-state counsel directed the letter of inquiry to the court on
September 25, 1979. Id.
Id. at 228.
'Id.
Id. In Hensley, Hensley's local counsel brought the motion to vacate and reenter,
alleging excusable neglect to justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6) and Rule 4(a). See Appendix
to Brief for Appellant at 12-14, 651 F.2d 227 (1981). Rule 4(a) was inapposite at that time,
however, since the sixty-day appeals period had expired. See note 3 supra. Additionally, the
motion failed to indicate why the plaintiff chose to seek relief under Rule 60(b)(6) rather
than under Rule 60(b)(1), which expressly provides relief for "excusable neglect." See Ap-
pendix to Brief for Appellant at 12-14, supra; note 1 supra.
Hensley v. Chesapeake & Ohio R.R. Co., 86 F.R.D. 555, 561 (S.D.W.Va. 1980).
651 F.2d at 228.
30Id.
1, 273 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 927 (1960). In Cato Brothers, the
Fourth Circuit stated that a court generally should grant relief under Rule 60(b)(6) when the
movant has a meritorious claim or defense and when vacation and reentry of the "final"
judgment or order will not prejudice the non-moving party. Id. at 157. Other circuits also
employ this claim and prejudice analysis. See Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 189
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since Hensley would not have another opportunity to have the denial of
the motion reviewed on its merits32 and because C&O had not shown that
relitigation of the issue would prejudice the company.' Second, the court
ruled that the existing circumstances constituted something more than
the mere failure to notify Hensley's counsel.' The court found that
Hensley's counsel could have justifiably assumed that the court's deci-
sion on the motion might take a long time since the motion had pre-
sented sixteen grounds for argument. 5 The court underscored the prob-
able lack of familiarity of Hensley's out-of-state-counsel with local prac-
tice, and his likely desire not to antagonize the court with repeated
inquiries. 8 The court also emphasized that Hensley had stated in his
motion for a new trial that he intended to appeal a denial of the
motion 7 Third, the court found that Hensley's counsel had met the duty
of diligent inquiry.w The court acknowledged that the letter of inquiry
F.2d 242, 246 (3d Cir. 1951); Comment, Equitable Power of a Federal Court to Vacate a
Final Judgment for "Any Other Reason Justifying Relief'--Rule 60(b)(6), 33 Mo. L. REV.
427, 433 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Equitable Power]. The non-moving party justifiably may
claim prejudice when it has relied upon the judgment, and vacation would affect the non-
moving partyadversely. See Meadows v. Cohen, 409 F.2d 750,753 (5th Cir. 1969); Erick Rios
Bridoux v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 214 F.2d 207, 210 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 348 U.S. 821
(1954); Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 426 F. Supp. 1297, 1311-12 (E.D. Pa. 1977), affd, 558 F.2d
150, cerL denied 434 U.S. 943 (1977). A non-moving party's reliance upon the anticipated
receipt of a financial award that results in a change in the non-moving party's circumstances
or lifestyle may preclude Rule 60(b)(6) relief. See 409 F.2d at 753. Additionally, prejudice
may arise when a change in circumstances precludes the non-moving party from an effective
relitigation upon remand. See Rinieri v. News Syndicate Co., 385 F.2d 818, 823 (2d Cir.
1967); McCawley v. Fleischmann Transp. Co., 10 F.R.D. 624, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
* 86 F.R.D. at 560.
13Id. The substantive issue on appeal in Hensley would have been the propriety of the
district court's denial of the motion for a new trial, not the earlier judgment itself. See
Pagan v. American Airlines, Inc., 534 F.2d 990, 992-93 (1st Cir. 1976); Hodgson v. UMW, 473
F.2d 118, 124 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Wagner v. United States, 316 F.2d 871, 872 (2d Cir. 1963)
(per curiam); MOORE, supra note 11, 60.30[3].
86 F.R.D. at 560. Presumbly, the phrase "something more" reflected the application
of the "extraordinary circumstances" test by the district court in Hensley. See text accom-
panying note 60 infra.
86 F.R.D. at 560-61.
Id. at 561.
.id.
Id. at 560. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d) implicitly charges the prospective
appellant with a duty to diligently inquire into the progress of his case. 651 F.2d at 231.
Counsel for a 60(b)(6) movant discharges his duty of diligent inquiry by inquiring of the
district court or clerk of the court the status of the case. See, e.g., Mizell v. Attorney Gen. of
N.Y., 586 F.2d 942, 944 n.2 (2d Cir. 1978) (no diligent attempt to discharge duty when counsel
waited three months following final judgment, never inquired, and did not learn of decision
until publication of advance sheets), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 967 (1979); Buckeye Cellulose
Corp. v. Braggs Elec. Constr. Co., 569 F.2d 1036, 1037 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (diligent
inquiry when counsel inquired three times at office of clerk of district court); Fidelity &
Dep. Co. v. Usaform Hail Pool, Inc., 523 F.2d 744, 751 (5th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 425 U.S.
950 (1976) ("suitable inquiries" when counsel, upon receiving draft opinion of district court,
requested court to delay entering final judgment); Planter's Trust and Savings Bank v. Mor-
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by Hensley's counsel reflected his justifiable expectation that the court
had not yet rendered its decision. 9 Additionally, the court noted that
Hensley had filed his Rule 60(b)(6) motion within the requisite reasonable
time after having received notice of the final order."
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's order
that had granted the Rule 60(b)(6) motion to vacate the earlier order. 1
Holding that the district court abused its discretion by granting
Hensley's Rule 60(b)(6) motion,42 the Fourth Circuit opined that trial
courts should rarely find that circumstances are sufficiently extraordi-
nary or unique to justify Rule 60(b)(6) relief.43 The Hensley court further
held that Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure bars Rule
60(b) relief when the sole reason asserted for that relief is the failure to
receive notice.4 The Fourth Circuit distinguished the decisions upon
which the district court had relied as involving unique or extraordinary
circumstances. 5 The Hensley court found that the plaintiff had not
demonstrated the unique or extraordinary circumstances required to cir-
cumvent the proscription of Rule 77(d).46 The court held that counsel's ex-
pectation of some delay in the rendering of the district court's decision
did not warrant his waiting for six months before inquiring into the
status of the case.4 7 Additionally, the court found that a unique or extra-
ordinary circumstance did not arise as a result of plaintiff's early
notification to the district court of his intention to appeal in the event
the court should deny his motion. 8 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that if it
were to sanction the Rule 60(b)(6) vacation and re-entry procedure on the
facts in Hensley, Rule 77(d) would never bar Rule 60(b) relief.49 The court
row (In re Morrow), 502 F.2d 520, 523 (5th Cir. 1974) (clear wording and intent of Rule 77(d)
require more than mere failure to notice to permit appeal); Lathrop v. Oklahoma City Hous.
Authority, 438 F.2d 914, 915 (10th Cir.) (per curiam) (Rule 77(d) charges client of prospective
appellant with duty of following progress of action and advising himself when court makes
order he wishes to protest), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 840 (1971); Long v. Emery, 383 F.2d 392,
394 (10th Cir. 1967) (same); Nichols-Morris Corp. v. Morris, 279 F.2d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 1960)
(same).
" 86 F.R.D. at 561.
40 Id.
1 651 F.2d at 231. The Hensley court also vacated the district court's recently
reentered order of denial. Id. The Fourth Circuit reentered the earlier order and dismissed




's Id. at 229-30; see, e.g., Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 613-14 (1949);
Buckeye Cellulose Corp. v. Braggs Elec. Constr. Co., 569 F.2d 1036, 1038 (8th Cir. 1978) (per
curiam); Smith v. Jackson Tool & Die, Inc., 426 F.2d 5, 8 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
" 651 F.2d at 230.
'4 Id. at 230-31.
'Id.
" Id. at 231. The Hensley court stated that in no event should a court permit counsel
to wait six months before inquiring into the court's decision on a motion. Id.
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concluded that Hensley had based his motion solely on his failure to
receive notice of the entry. 0 Thus, since Rule 77(d) bars relief when the
sole ground for relief is the failure to receive notice, the Fourth Circuit
ruled that the district court had improperly granted the motion.
5 '
The Fourth Circuit adopted the Tenth Circuit's position "2 that Rule
77(d) charges the prospective appellant with a duty to inquire diligently
into the progress of his case. The court found that Hensley's counsel,
having waited six months before inquiring into the status of the district
court's decision, had failed to discharge his duty of diligent inquiry.1
Consequently, the Hensley court concluded that the district court im-
properly granted relief under Rule 60(b).15 The Fourth Circuit thus held
that since the factual context did not reflect unique or extraordinary cir-
cumstances, and because Hensley's counsel had not discharged his duty
of inquiry, the district court had abused its discretion by granting the
plaintiffs motion for relief.
The Fourth Circuit's holding that Rule 77(d) bars Rule 60(b)(6) relief
when the failure to receive notice of the entry of the judgment consti-
tutes the sole basis asserted for relief is consistent with the wording and
policy of Rule 77(d). The Advisory Committee clearly acknowledged that
the purpose of the 1946 amendment to Rule 77(d) was to promote the
finality of judgments."' The Advisory Committee sought to limit the ex-
cessive discretion that the language of Rule 60(b)(6) had granted to the
district courts.58 Further, the exceptional circumstances requirement im-
posed by the Hensley court accords with the majority of courts that
have considered whether to grant relief under clause (6) of Rule 60(b). 9
50 Id.
5! Id.
See Lathrop v. Oklahoma City Hous. Authority, 438 F.2d 914, 915 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 890 (1971); Long v. Emery, 383 F.2d 392, 394 (10th Cir. 1967); Buckley v.
United States, 382 F.2d 611, 614 (10th Cir. 1967); cert. denied, 390 U.S. 997 (1968).




ISee FED. R. Civ. P. 77(d Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules. The purpose of the
1946 amendment to Rule 77(d) was to overrule Hill v. Hawes, 320 U.S. 520 (1944). See id.;
MOORE, supra note 11, 77.114]. In Hill, the clerk failed to send notice of entry of a judgment
to counsel. 320 U.S. at 520-21. The district court vacated its judgment and reentered it to
permit the party to appeal. Id. The court reasoned that the prospective appellant was
justified in relying on lack of notice. Id. The Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 524. The Advi-
sory Committee made it clear that the purpose of the 1946 amendment to Rule 77(d) was to
nullify Hill. See FED. R. Civ. P. 77(d) Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules (entirely un-
safe for party to rely on absence of notice from clerk).
" See FED. R. Civ. P. 77(d Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules; MOORE, supra note
11, 77.0114].
" See, e.g., Polites v. United States, 364 U.S. 426, 431-32 (1960); Ackermann v. United
States, 340 U.S. 193, 200 (1950); Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 613-14 (1949);
Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 401 (5th Cir. 1981); Good Luck Nursing Home,
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The Fourth Circuit is among the growing number of circuits that
recognize the implicit duty of the prospective appellant's attorney to
keep himself advised of the progress of his case." Imposition of the duty
of diligent inquiry is consistent with Rule 77(d).61 The Advisory Commit-
tee has stated that it would be unwise for counsel to rely on lack of
notice as a basis for Rule 60(b) relief.2 Decisions of the Second, Fifth,
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits reaffirm the admonition to diligently inquire
into the progress of litigation. 3 Courts have found that a litigant's
failure to receive notice will rise to the level of an extraordinary cir-
cumstance only after the clerk has assured the inquiring litigant that he
will receive notice and the litigant has relied on this assurance. 4
While the result in Hensley may be correct, the reasoning is ques-
tionable. In denying Rule 60(b)(6) relief, the Hensley court reasoned that
the policy that supports an application of Rule 60(b)(6) is that of provid-
Inc. v. Harris, 636 F.2d 572, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Compton v. Alton Steamship Co., 608 F.2d
96, 102 (4th Cir. 1979); Boughner v. Secretary of HEW, 572 F.2d 976, 978 (3d Cir. 1978);
Buckeye Cellulose Corp. v. Braggs Elec. Constr. Co., 569 F.2d 1036, 1038 (8th Cir. 1978) (per
curiam); International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 556 F.2d 665, 671 (2d Cir. 1977), cerL denied,
434 U.S. 1014 (1978); Brader v. University of Pittsburgh, 552 F.2d 948, 954 (3d Cir. 1977);
Fidelity & Dep. Co. v. Usaform Hail Pool, Inc., 523 F.2d 744, 750 (5th Cir. 1975), cert denied,
425 U.S. 950 (1976); Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enterprises v. Smithsonian Inst., 500
F.2d 808, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Smith v. Jackson Tool & Die, Inc., 426 F.2d 5, 8
(5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam); Radack v. Norwegian American Line Agency, 318 F.2d 538,
542-43 (2d Cir. 1963); United States v. Cato Bros., 273 F.2d 153, 157 (4th Cir. 1959), cerL
denied, 362 U.S. 927 (1960). Many courts, however, never mention the extraordinary cir-
cumstances test. See, e.g., Planter's Trust and Savings Bank v. Morrow (In re Morrow), 502
F.2d 520, 521-23 (5th Cir. 1974); Cinerama Inc. v. Sweet Music, S.A., 482 F.2d 66, 71 (2d Cir.
1973); Hodgson v. UMW, 473 F.2d 118, 124 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Lord v. Helmandollar, 348 F.2d
780, 782-83 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (per curiam), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 928 (1966); Demers v. Brown,
343 F.2d 427, 428 (1st Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 818 (1965); Wagner v. United
States, 316 F.2d 871, 872 (2d Cir. 1963) (per curiam); Williams v. Sahi, 292 F.2d 249, 251-52
(6th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 977 (1962). Courts fail to mention the extraordinary cir-
cumstances test for one of two reasons. See Kane, supra note 4, at 58. Some courts refuse to
recognize the use of Rule 60(b)(6) to extend the time for appeal. Id. Other courts, while en-
dorsing Rule 60(b)(6) for such a purpose, do not term their inquiry an "extraordinary circum-
stances test" because they are not certain as to the application of the standard. Id. One com-
mentator has concluded that the test is similar to that described by Justice Stewart in the
pornography area. Id.; see Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurr-
ing) ("I know it when I see it").
See note 38 supra.
81 See note 3 supra.
82 See note 57 supra.
See note 38 supra.
See, e.g., Buckeye Cellulose Corp. v. Braggs Elec. Constr. Co., 569 F.2d 1036, 1038-39
(8th Cir. 1978). In Buckeye, the Eighth Circuit found extraordinary circumstances justifying
relief when counsel inquired three times into the status of his case, the clerk assured
counsel that he would notify him of the decision, counsel relied on this assurance, and the
clerk failed to notify counsel within the sixty-day appeal period. Id.; accord, Fidelity & Dep.
Co. v. Usaform Hail Pool, Inc., 523 F.2d 744, 751 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 950
(1976).
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ing an ascertainable end to litigation so litigants may rely on final
judgments and order their affairs accordingly." The court, however, did
not address the countervailing consideration of rendering justice to a
particular litigant." The Hensley court thus seems to have abandoned
the Cato Brothers analysis, which the district court applied"7 and the
Fourth Circuit employed recently in Compton v. Alton Steamship Co."
In Compton, the Fourth Circuit underscored the delicate balancing of
the principles of finality and individual justice when the movant sought
vacation and reentry of a default judgment. 9 The Compton court, not
limiting its directive to the default or dismissal context, emphasized that
the movant in a Rule 60(b) motion must make a prima facie showing of a
meritorious claim should he relitigate the case." The Compton court fur-
ther stated that the district court should consider whether Rule 60(b)
vacation and reentry would prejudice the non-moving party." The
district court in Hensley employed the Compton analysis in conjunction
with the extraordinary circumstances test."
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit did not address whether Hensley had
shown a meritorious claim or whether the district court's granting of the
Rule 60(b)(6) motion would have prejudiced C&O. 7 1 Instead, the Fourth
Circuit required the movant to make a prima facie showing of having
discharged his duty to inquire. 4 Since the Hensley court determined
that Hensley's counsel had failed to discharge his duty, the court denied
relief.W 5 Courts most often allow relitigation in cases involving default
judgments or dismissals because of the preference for judgments based
on full adversarial exploration of the issues. ' The Fourth Circuit,
however, did not limit its holding to the situation in which a litigant
seeks relief from final judgment after a trial on the merits.77 As a result,
it is not clear whether the court has abandoned the Cato Brothers claim
and prejudice examination in the non-default or non-dismissal context.
The court may intend to retain the claim and prejudice analysis, but
simply did not reach the inquiry on the facts in Hensley since the movant
failed to make the requisite prima facie showing of diligent inquiry.
65 651 F.2d at 228.
" See text accompanying note 4 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 31-33 supra.




71 See text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
73 See text accompanying notes 67-78 supra.
T' 651 F.2d at 231.
75 Id.
76 Kane, supra note 4, at 71.
71 651 F.2d at 231.
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Additionally, the holding of the Hensley court that the district court
abused its discretion78 in granting relief reflects the stricter standard
now imposed by the Fourth Circuit when a litigant seeks Rule 60(b)(6)
relief after a trial on the merits. The Fourth Circuit previously had held
that when denial of a pre-trial motion precluded a full consideration of
the merits of the case, the appellate courts should closely scrutinize the
trial court's exercise of discretion. 9 The Fourth Circuit enunciated the
strict scrutiny standard to permit district courts to exercise broad
discretion in granting Rule 60(b)(6) relief after a default judgment or
dismissal.0 In contrast, the Hensley court's finding of abuse of discretion
in the granting of Rule 60(b)(6) relief serves as a warning to district
courts within the Fourth Circuit that absent a prima facie showing by
the movant of discharge of his duty to inquire, the Fourth Circuit will
reverse a district court's finding of exceptional circumstances." The
Hensley holding thus serves as an implicit warning to district courts
within the Fourth Circuit to exercise narrower discretion in granting
Rule 60(b)(6) relief after a trial on the merits.
Finally, the decision of the Hensley court, while promoting the policy
of finality, may be unduly harsh to the plaintiff who was himself diligent
in inquiring of his counsel into the status of his case.82 Hensley's own
78 Id.
"' See Strader v. Hall, 20 F.R. Serv. 2d 531 (4th Cir. 1975). In Strader the pro se Rule
60(b) movant had failed to receive notice of the state's motion for summary judgment filed
against him since he was at the time being transferred from one penal facility to another. Id.
The district court denied Strader's motion. Id. The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that the
trial court had abused its discretion. Id. The Strader court, emphasizing that courts should
resolve any doubt in favor of setting aside the judgment when the defendant has not en-
joyed a full trial on the merits, held that relief was appropriate under the Rule 60(b)(1) pro-
vision for "excusable neglect." Id. See also Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d
242, 246 (3d Cir. 1951) (appellate court should not disturb Rule 60(b) determination of trial
court unless abuse of discretion). Under Rule 60(b), a trial court abuses its discretion only if
no reasonable man could agree with the trial court's decision. See Smith v. Widman Truck-
ing & Excavating, Inc., 627 F.2d 792, 795-96 (7th Cir. 1980); Ruiz v. Hamburg-American
Line; 478 F.2d 29, 31 (9th Cir. 1973). Broad trial court discretion is proper in Rule 60(b)
analysis because the trial judge is in a better position than the appellate court to determine
credibility of evidence and witnesses. See Farmer's Co-op. Elevator Ass'n. Non-stock v.
Strand, 382 F.2d 224, 231-32 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1014 (1967); International Nikoh
Corp. v. H. K. Porter Co., 374 F.2d 82, 84 (7th Cir. 1967)' (per curiam).
See Fackelman v. Bell, 564 F.2d 734, 735-36 (5th Cir. 1977) (preference for full con-
sideration of merits of case).
81 651 F.2d at 231.
See Appendix to Brief for Appellant at 9, 651 F.2d 227 (1981). In Hensley, Hensley
wrote to his local counsel on July 17, 1979, inquiring into the status of the March 23, 1979
motion for a new trial. Id. In a letter dated July 24, 1979, Hensley's counsel responded that
he did not know of any way to force the judge to make a decision, but he assumed that the
court would render the decision soon. Id. at 10. At the time Hensley wrote to his counsel,
only thirty-nine days had passed since the court had rendereds its decision on July 8, 1979.
Thus, twenty-one days remained during which Hensley court have filed for appeal under
Rule 4(a) on the ground of "excusable neglect." See note 3 supra.
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diligence notwithstanding, the Fourth Circuit implicitly imputed his at-
torney's negligence to him.' His sole recourse would appear to be a suit
for malpractice against his counsel. 4 While a malpractice suit could pro-
vide some compensation for the injured client and would not disturb the
finality of the earlier judgment, this avenue of relief is unsatisfactory
because the action would prove costly. Additionally, a suit for malprac-
tice would not promote judicial efficiency.85 Finally, the action might
ultimately prove unsuccessful since Hensley would have to show that his
was a case of extreme negligence. 8
In Hensley, the Fourth Circuit recognized that the policy of finality
allows only infrequent granting of Rule 60(b)(6) relief from final judg-
ment. The court coupled its broad emphasis on finality, however, with
neitherdiscussion nor acknowledgment of the traditional countervailing
policy consideration, the rendering of justice to an individual litigant in
light of all of the facts of the particular case.8" Consequently, the Hensley
decision serves as a warning to prospective appellants, their counsel,
and the district courts within the Fourth Circuit. After the entry of a
final judgment or order following a trial on the merits, counsel for pro-
spective appellants must make a prima facie showing of having dili-
See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633 (1902). In Link, the trial court
dismissed an action for failure to prosecute when the plaintiff's attorney did not appear for
a scheduled pre-trial conference and offered no reasonable excuse for his non-appearance.
Id. at 627-29. The appellate court and the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding
that the dismissal did not impose an unjust penalty on the client since the client had volun-
tarily chosen the attorney as his representative and thus was bound by the acts of his
lawyer. Id. at 633. But see Peterson v. Term Taxi Inc., 429 F.2d 888, 891-92 (2d Cir. 1970)
(defaulting party's unintentional late arrival in court arguably constitutes grounds for vaca-
tion under Rule 60(b)(1) even though conduct demonstrates "failure of judgment" and "is an
affront to the court").
" See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 634 n.10 (1902). In Link, the Court
grounded its imputation of attorney negligence to the client by reasoning that the client's
remedy was a suit for malpractice. Id. Several courts, including the Fourth Circuit, have
followed Link, holding the client to the consequence of his presumably voluntary selection
of counsel. See, e.g., Universal Film Exchs., Inc. v. Lust, 479 F.2d 573, 576-77 (4th Cir. 1973);
Kostenbauder v. Secretary of HEW, 71 F.R.D. 449, 452-53 (M.D. Pa. 1976); United States v.
Manos, 56 F.R.D. 655, 660 (S.D. Ohio 1972); Geigel v. Sea Land Serv., Inc., 44 F.R.D. 1, 2
(D.P.R. 1968). Other courts, however, have refused to follow Link on motions for relief from
judgment, distinguishing the decision or ignoring it on the assumption that Rule 60(b) is a
permissible way of relieving the client from the error of his attorney. See, e.g., Boughner v.
Secretary of HEW, 572 F.2d 976, 978 (3d Cir. 1978); L.P. Steuart, Inc. v. Matthews, 329 F.2d
234, 235-36 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 824 (1964); Radack v. Norwegian America Line
Agency, 318 F.2d 538, 542 (2d Cir. 1963); 50 IowA L. REV. 641, 646-48 (1965); W. VA. L. REV.
173, 175 (1965).
11 See Moore & Rogers, Federal Relief from Civil Judgments, 55 YALE L.J. 623, 623
(1946) (doctrine of judicial finality promotes efficient and orderly administration of judicial
system); accord, Comment, Temporal Aspects of the- Finality of Judgments-The
Significance of Federal Rule 60(b), 17 U. CHi. L. REV. 664, 664 (1950).
See Huszagh & Malloy, Legal Malpractice: A Calculus for Reform, 37 MONT. L. REV.
279, 282 (1976). See generally Marks & Cathcart, Discipline Within the Ldgal Profession: Is
It Self-Regulation?, 1974 U. ILL. L. F. 193.
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